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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Rep. Vol. 9 2002). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction subject to
assignment by the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
First Issue (Causation)
Whether the trial court erred in its Findings of Fact on causation that:
(A) "The only facts concerning causation or the mechanism of injury in the instant case
that may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses by a lay witness are that Linda Fox was
descending the stairs and she fell. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record 918, 916,
110.)
(B) "No lay witness can, by the ordinary use of the lay witness's senses, testify that
whether the fall of Linda Fox was or was not caused by the symptomatic medical condition of
Linda Fox's knee." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record 918, 916, flO.)
(C) "Linda Fox fell without physical intervention of any actor." (Findings of Fact,
Record, t i l . )
(D) "No person inspected the stairs after Linda Fox's alleged fall to determine the
condition of the stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell." (Findings of Fact, Record 915,
113.)
(E) "Plaintiffs do not know which stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell"
(Findings of Fact, Record 916, % 14.)
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
First Issue (Causation)
The standard of review when considering on appeal the Findings of Fact of a trial court is
the clearly erroneous standard. "To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings of fact,
an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings. See, e.g., Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 390, 360
P.2d 176 (1961); Hutcheson v. Gleave, Utah, 632 P.2d 815 (1981); Kohler v. Garden City, Utah,
639 P.2d 162, 165 (1981); Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 743
(1982)." Scharfv. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah, 1985).
Issue Not Preserved in the Trial Court. Mr. and Mrs. Fox claim that the Findings of Fact
set forth above were in error and that Mr. and Mrs. Fox preserved that issue in the trial court.
They did not. As to the paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (designated
as paragraph A, above) nothing in the Transcript of the Bench Trial contains a representation that
Mr. and Mrs. Fox would present evidence concerning causation or the mechanism of injury that a
lay witness would be able to, with the ordinary use of the senses, determine more than that Linda
Fox was descending the stairs, and she fell (R. 924).
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue set forth in paragraph B, above, in the trial
court. The transcript (R. 924) contains no representation that testimony would be adduced that a
lay witness could, by the ordinary use of the lay witness's senses, testify whether the fall of Mrs.
Fox was or was not caused by the symptomatic medical condition of Mrs. Fox's knee (R. 924).
As is set forth below, the Record is replete with verification of Mrs. Fox's pre-existing,
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symptomatic medical condition. This appears in the uncontested portions of the Findings of Fact
where the Court found: that Mrs. Fox had been told by Dr. Richard Jackson that Mrs. Fox would
require a future knee replacement (R. 917, P ) ; in the Spring of 2003, Dr. Richard Jackson had xrayed Mrs. Fox's right knee and reported to her that her right knee was missing cartilage and
diagnosed Mrs. Fox with an arthritic knee (R. 917, f4); prior to the April 20, 2004, fall, Mrs. Fox
had some cartilage missing in her right knee due to osteoarthritis (R. 916, ^6); before her fall on
April 20, 2004, Mrs. Fox reported having pain on the lateral side of her right knee; (R. 916, Tf7);
and prior to Mrs. Fox's fall on April 20, 2004, Mrs. Fox was diagnosed with having some joint
space narrowing in her right knee (R. 916, f 8).
The issue of whether Mrs. Fox fell without physical intervention of any actor (paragraph
C, above) was not preserved as an issue in the trial court. There is nothing in the record that
indicates or references any third party who in some way intervened to cause Mrs. Fox to fall.
Brigham Young University (BYU) cannot cite to the record in this instance because there is no
portion of the record that would reflect the absence of this information.
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve as an issue in the trial court whether or not a person
inspected the stairs after Mrs. Fox's alleged fall to determine the condition of the stair Mrs. Fox
was on when she allegedly fell (paragraph D, above). Mr. Fox represented to the trial court that
two days after Mrs. Fox fell, he examined the stairway and took photographs to show the general
deterioration of the stairs. u[Mr. Fox] took photographs of the stairs not knowing exactly where
[Mrs. Fox] had fallen." He further represented that after Mrs. Fox was released from the
hospital, about three weeks later, they went to the stairs and found that the stairs had been
completely rebuilt. (R. 924, p. 19, lines 3-13).
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Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve in the trial court the issue that "Plaintiffs did not know
which stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell" (paragraph E, above). As is set forth in
the immediately preceding paragraph of this brief, when Mr. Fox went to the stairs, he did not
know exactly where Mrs. Fox had fallen (R. 924, p. 19, lines 8 & 9). Mrs. Fox testified in an
affidavit that she did not know the exact location where she fell (R. 316, ]f21).

Second Issue (Conclusions of Law)
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that:
(A) "... the Plaintiffs had no witness who could testify as to the condition of the stairs and
had no witness who could testify as to whether or not the stairs were dangerous ..." (Conclusions
ofLaw,R.,p. 915, fl).
(B) "The Plaintiffs' determination that they would call no expert witnesses on any
subject, including but not limited to: a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and b. Linda Fox's
medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 29, 2004; precluded evidence that
Linda Fox's fall was not caused by her symptomatic, pre-existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing,
knee which had loss of cartilage." (Conclusions of Law, R. 915, |2).
(C) "In the absence of any expert witness who could opine as to whether Mrs. Fox fell
because of her symptomatic, pre-existing condition as described above or for some other cause,
the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of proof as to causation." (Conclusions of Law, R. 914,

TO.
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(D) "In the absence of any healthcare provider who could opine as to the reasonable
necessity of any healthcare received by the Plaintiff Linda Fox, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their
burden of proof as to damages." (Conclusions of Law, R. 914, f5).
(E) "Joseph R. Fox's claim is for loss of consortium. Because Linda A. Fox cannot
sustain her burden of proof as to causation nor as to damages, the Plaintiff Joseph R. Fox's claim
for loss of consortium fails." (Conclusions of Law, R. 914, ^[6).
The standard of review for Conclusions of Law is that Conclusions of Law are reviewed
by the Appellate Court for correctness. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Issue Not Preserved in the Trial Court. Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the Second
Issue (Conclusions of Law) in the trial court.
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue of whether or not they had a witness who
could testify as to the condition of the stairs and whether or not the stairs were dangerous. Mr.
and Mrs. Fox stipulated the case would be tried without any expert of any kind including an
expert on causation/mechanism of injury. (R. 917, f2(a)). Furthermore, as is set forth above,
both Mr. and Mrs. Fox said they did not know the location of where Mrs. Fox allegedly fell (R.
R. 316, f21). Without knowing the location where Mrs. Fox allegedly fell, no witness could
testify as to the condition of that stair.
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue of whether or not Mrs. Fox's fall was or was
not caused by her symptomatic, pre-existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee which had a
loss of cartilage (paragraph B, above). Mr. and Mrs. Fox stipulated that they would have no
expert witness. There is no representation that Mr. or Mrs. Fox were prepared to call any witness
-5-

who, on their own, could testify that Mrs. Fox's fall was not caused by her symptomatic, preexisting, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee which had a loss of cartilage. Mr. and Mrs. Fox did
not provide to the court any statutory or case law which would have sufficiently alerted the court
to a contrary legal position. (R. 924).
The issue of whether, in the absence of any expert witness who could opine as to whether
Mrs. Fox fell because of her symptomatic, pre-existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee
which had a loss of cartilage as described above, or for some other cause, Mr. and Mrs. Fox
could or could not sustain their burden of proof as the causation was not preserved in the trial
court. There is no citation by Mr. or Mrs. Fox to any statutory or case law that was presented to
the court during the November 14, 2006, bench trial to support their side of this proposition (R.
924).
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue of whether, in the absence of any healthcare
provider who could opine as to the reasonable necessity of any healthcare received by Mrs. Fox,
Mr. and Mrs. Fox could or could not sustain their burden of proof as to damages. Mr. and Mrs.
Fox were, apparently, prepared to testify that they received certain bills allegedly arising out of
Mrs. Fox's alleged injuries, and this was preserved on the Record (R. 924, p. 16, lines 23-25).
There is nothing in the Record td the effect that Mr. or Mrs. Fox could opine as to the reasonable
necessity of the healthcare, nor the reasonable value of the bills.
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue of whether or not Mr. Fox's claim for loss of
consortium would fail if Mrs. Fox could not sustain her burden of proof as to causation and as to
damages. Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not argue the loss of consortium issue to the court (R. 924,
Index, Sheet 2, second column (the word "consortium" does not appear in the transcript)).
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Third Issue (Validity of UCA § 78-27-33, as amended).
Whether the trial court was correct in holding that UCA §78-27-33, as amended, was
impliedly repealed and was unconstitutional on its face as being inconsistent with Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2) and Rule 803(4).
This issue was preserved in the trial court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTE AND RULE
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
The constitutional provision, statute and rule whose interpretation may be determinative
of this appeal is set forth below. They are determinative only of the Third Issue presented by Mr.
and Mrs. Fox.
A.

Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court
- Judges pro tempore - Regulation of practice of law.]

The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used
in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by the constitution, the Supreme Court
by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United
States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law.

B.

78-27-33. Statement of injured person - When inadmissible as
evidence.

Except as otherwise provided in this act, any statement, either written or
oral, obtained from an injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while
this person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a result of injuries sustained
-7-

in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a person whose interest is
adverse or may become adverse to the injured person, except a peace officer, shall
not be admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding brought by or against the
injured person for damages sustained as a result of the occurrence, unless:
(1) a written verbatim copy of the statement has been left with the injured
party at the time the statement was taken; and
(2) the statement has not been disavowed in writing within fifteen days of
the date of the statement or within fifteen days after the date of the injured
person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which the person has
been confined, whichever date is later.

Utah Court Rules
C.

Preliminary Note

On October 7, 1977, at the request of the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah State Bar
Commission established a special committee to examine whether the Federal
Rules of Evidence should be adopted by practice before the courts of the State of
Utah. The committee was composed of Parker M. Nielson, Chairman, the
Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, the Honorable
George E. Ballif, Professor Ronald N. Boyce, Professor Edward L. Kimball,
Ramon M. Child and Stephen B. Nebeker. Ronald J. Yengich and Virginius
Dabney were subsequently added to the committee.
The Committee met pursuant to the foregoing appointment, and recommended
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the Superior Court pursuant to the
general judicial powers contained in the Constitution of the United States. Article
VIII, Section 1 to supervise inferior courts, and pursuant to the statutory
rulemaking power of the Supreme Court contained in Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-2-4 (1953). It was the view of the Committee that, while the
legislature many not enlarge judicial powers beyond those prescribed by the
Constitution of Utah, Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 93, 104 Pac. 760 (1908), the
power to promulgate rules is within the general judicial powers conferred by
Article VIII, Section 1. Any existing statutes inconsistent with these rules, if and
when these rules are adopted by the Supreme Court, will be impliedly repealed.
The effort in proposing these rules, as with the Federal Rules of Evidence on
which they are based, is not to codify the law of evidence, but to formulate guides
from which the law of evidence can grow and develop. These rules therefore
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supply a fresh starting place for the law of evidence and do not present an ultimate
end.
The numbering and test of these rules conform to the Federal Rules of Evidence
as promulgated by the Congress of the United States, effective July 1, 1975;
except (1) where modifications of the text were made necessary by the fact that
these rules govern state rather than federal proceedings and (2) in a small number
of instances in which the rule adopted was considered sufficiently superior to the
federal rule to justify departure from the objective of uniformity between Utah and
federal rules. Where such modifications have been necessary, numbering
consistent with the Federal Rules has been maintained. Unless modified,
reference to the notes of the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of
Evidence is pertinent to the meaning and effect of these rules, together with notes
of the Advisory Committee to these rules.

"The issue of 'whether a statute is constitutional' is a question of law, which we review
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, p. 30, 40
P.3d 611; see also State v. Kell, 2002 UT 19, p. 50, P.3d 1019; Grand County v. Emery County,
969 P.2d 421, 422 (Utah 1998). Furthermore, to the extent we are making a determination of a
statute's constitutionality, the "statute is presumed constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable
doubts in favor of constitutionality.'" Utah Sch. Bds. Ass 'n v. State Bd. ofEduc., 2001 UT 2, p. 9,
17 P.3d 1125 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Daniels, 2002 UT 2 at p. 30. Grand
County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57; 52 P.3d 1148 (Utah 2002).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Mr. and Mrs. Fox allege that Mrs. Fox was injured on April 20,
2004, when she fell on the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center
(hereunder "the stairs") as she descended the stairs. (R. 917, %l9 see also R. 740 & 739, |8). Mrs.
Fox sought recovery for special and general damages she allegedly suffered on April 20, 2004.
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(R. 37-31). Mr. Fox, a disbarred attorney (R. 782, f 5 and R. 776 "Order"), sought to recover for
loss of consortium (R. 32 and 31,131). BYU denied it was liable to either Mr. or Mrs. Fox. (R.
171-169).

Disposition in Court Below. On December 12, 2006, the Court below entered a "Judgment of
Dismissal with Prejudice" (R. 921-919). The Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice was based
upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered December 12, 2006 (R. 913-912). In
general terms, the Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law determined that because: the Plaintiffs stipulated they would try this case
without any expert witness of any kind on any subject; Mrs. Fox had a symptomatic, pre-existing,
osteoarthritic, joint narrowing knee; and that there would be no testimony that anyone had
inspected the stairs after Mrs. Fox's alleged fall to determine the condition of the stair Mrs. Fox
was on when she allegedly fell; that the Plaintiffs could not sustain their burden of proof as to
causation nor as to damages. Because Mrs. Fox's claim failed, Mr. Fox's claim for loss of
consortium also failed (R. 913-912). On December 12, 2006, the Court also entered an Order
Denying Plaintiffs' Objections to the Testimony of Noah Converse and Scott Starr, with
Accompanying Exhibits. Mr. and Mrs. Fox's objection was based upon Utah Code Ann. §78-2733, a statutory rule of evidence which, under certain conditions, if enforceable, would make
statements of an injured person inadmissible as evidence in a civil proceeding (R. 911-906).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Mr. and Mrs. Fox allege that Mrs. Fox was injured on April 20, 2004, when she fell on
the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center (hereinafter "the stairs") as
she descended the stairs (R. 917, Tjl; see also R. 740 & 739, f 8). Mrs. Fox does not know the
exact location where she fell. (R. 316, f21). During oral arguments Mr. Fox conceded that he
did not know exactly where Mrs. Fox had fallen either (R. 924, p. 19, lines 8 & 9).
While Mrs. Fox was being attended to by the emergency medical services (EMS)
personnel on the stairs, Mrs. Fox reported to them:
(A) there was no cartilage in her knee due to arthritis;
(B) her knee went out as she was going down the stairs;
(C) she fell down only one stair;
(D) her knee just went out on her as she was going down the stairs and she did not hold
BYU responsible; and
(E) that the stairs where she fell are too narrow and have always been dangerous. (R.
739,1J11).
The emergency medical services personnel did not observe any loose metal nosings on
the stairway where Mrs. Fox fell on April 20, 2004. (R. 738, f 15). Where Mrs. Fox fell is
consistent with a knee that gave out and inconsistent with someone who tripped and fell. (R. 738,
If 17). While being treated by the emergency medical services personnel, Mrs. Fox self reported
as part of her past medical history that she had arthritis in her right knee (the leg that was injured)
and she further self reported that her knee just went out on her as she was going down the stairs.
(R. 737, f20). Mrs. Fox was transported in a van supplied by BYU to the Utah Valley Regional
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Medical Center by the emergency medical services personnel. (R. 737, ^19). Upon arrival at the
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Fox and her son noted that on April 19, 2004, they
were talking and had expressed surprise that Mrs. Fox had not had a serious problem or injury
with her knee. (R. 737, ^fl9). Approximately one year prior to her fall, Mrs. Fox had been
examined by Dr. Jackson for pain in her right knee. (R. 755, ^[2). Dr. Jackson reported that Mrs.
Fox had arthritis in the knee and was missing some cartilage. (R. 755, f2). Dr. Jackson reported
that Mrs. Fox, at some time in the future, would probably have to have her knee replaced but that
she should put off the replacement as long as possible. (R. 755, f2).
After arriving at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Fox reported to Dr. Douglas
C. Murdock that at BYU while going down stairs, her right knee suddenly gave out and she
collapsed down to the ground falling down some steps. She landed on that same knee and had a
lot of discomfort and pain in that localized region. (R. 751, under "History of Present Illness'9).
That same day and while still at the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Fox reported to
Dr. Jonathan R. Faux that while on the stairs at BYU, her knee gave out from underneath her in a
varus type deformity and further reported that she had pain in the knee mostly on the lateral side
prior to this and had a diagnosis of osteoarthritis and had joint space narrowing. (R. 747, under
"History of Present Illness"). In April, 2004, Mrs. Fox's Admission Diagnosis, and Discharge
Diagnosis, were: (1) right tibial plateau fracture; and (2) lateral compartment knee degenerative
joint disease. (R. 744, under both Admission Diagnosis and Discharge Diagnosis).
At the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Fox had surgery on her leg and had a
fixator installed. (R. 924, p. 15, lines 20-22). Mrs. Fox is not qualified to say what was done to
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her other than to say that a fixator was installed on her leg. (R. 924, p. 15, lines 23-25 and p. 16,
line 1).

Course of Proceedings. This matter was scheduled for a bench trial on November 14,
2006. The Plaintiffs stipulated they would try this case without any expert witness of any kind on
any subject, including but not limited to: (a) causation/mechanism of injury; and (b) Mrs. Fox's
medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 20, 2004. (R. 917, f2),
Prior to trial, the Defendant had taken the trial testimony of the emergency medical
services personnel (Noah Converse) attending Mrs. Fox immediately after she fell. (R. 853-852
and R. 857-856 and R. 924, p. 44, line 12 through p. 47, line 6).
The Plaintiffs objected to the admission of the trial testimony of Mr. Converse, taken
before the trial, and the admission of the emergency medical services reports that would recite
the statements of Mrs. Fox made on the stairs to the emergency medical services personnel on
April 20, 2004, the substance of which are set forth above and come from R. 739, f 11, a-e, R.
738, f 15 & 17, and R. 737, f 19 & 20. The Plaintiffs sought to exclude that evidence based upon
a foundational objection claiming that under §78-27-33 an injured person's statement cannot be
admitted into evidence unless a written verbatim copy of the statement had been left with the
injured party at the time the statement was taken; and the statement had not been disavowed in
writing within 15 days of the date of the statement or within 15 days after the date of the injured
person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which the person has been confined,
whichever date is later. (R. 924, p. 46, lines 19-25 and p. 47, lines 1-13).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First Issue (Causation) and Second Issue (Conclusions of Law)
Mr. and Mrs. Fox have failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings as required by Scharf, supra. Mr. and Mrs. Fox have also failed to preserve this issue in
the trial court as required by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5)(A).
The causal relationship between an injury and the subsequent need for surgery is an issue
requiring expert medical testimony. A plaintiff alleging such a causal relationship bears the
burden of proving proximate cause and can only do so by presenting expert medical testimony
establishing the probability of such a connection. Mr. and Mrs. Fox stipulated that there would
be so such testimony. Furthermore, no one inspected the stairs after Mrs. Fox's alleged fall and
Mrs. Fox does not know which stair she was on when she fell. Therefore, Mrs. Fox could not
testify as to what the negligent condition of the stair was upon which she fell. Further, there was
no expert to testify whether the condition of Mrs. Fox's knee or the condition of the stair was the
proximate cause of Mrs. Fox's fall.

Third Issue (Validity of Utah Code Ann., 78-27-33, as amended)
Mr. and Mrs. Fox objected to testimony of the emergency medical services personnel
who attended her on the stairs on April 20, 2004. Mr. and Mrs. Fox's objection was based upon
Utah Code Ann., §78-27-33, a statutory rule of evidence which, under certain conditions, if
enforceable, would make statements of an injured person inadmissible as evidence in a civil
proceeding. Mr. and Mrs. Fox allege that the conditions set forth in the statute apply. For the
purpose of the trial court's order, the court assumed that the conditions set forth in the statute
-14-

existed. The trial court denied Mr. and Mrs. Fox's objection because the statute was
unconstitutional pursuant to the Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, quoted above,
and as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in its September 10, 1985, per curiam order filed
September 10, 1985, also quoted above, and further augmented by the Preliminary Note to the
Utah Court Rules quoted above. This statutory rule of evidence is inconsistent with and is
superceded by Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2) and 803(4).

ARGUMENT
First Issue (Causation)
Mr. and Mrs. Fox asked this Court to find that the trial court erred in entering the
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 10, 11, 13 and 14. Paragraphs 10, 13 and 14 of the Findings of Fact
recite the Court's decision that, although Mrs. Fox was descending the stairs and fell, that no one
inspected the stairs where Mrs. Fox fell to determine the condition of the stair on which she fell.
The Court further determined that the Plaintiff did not know which stair Mrs. Fox was on when
she allegedly fell. Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits Mrs. Fox from testifying
where she fell and the condition of the stair. It states, in its entirety:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence
to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own
testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion
testimony by expert witnesses. (Amended effective October 1, 1992).
Because Mrs. Fox does not know where she fell and because she did not have anyone
who was able to inspect the stair, she could not testify that the condition of the stair caused her
fall. Without knowing the condition of the stair, there could be no finding of fact that the stair
-15-

was defective. This is particularly so in light of Mrs. Fox's symptomatic, pre-existing,
osteoarthritis, joint narrowing, knee that had loss of cartilage. Without someone to testify how
the stair condition could have caused Mrs. Fox to fall, there could be no plausible evidence that a
defective stair caused her to fall. Without such a defective stair, there could be no proximate
cause.
While proximate causation is generally an issue for the jury, a trial court may rule
as a matter of law on the issue if: "'(1) there is no evidence to establish a causal
connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable
persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the evidence on
proximate causation."' Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820
P.2d 482, 487 (Utah App. 1991), affd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)). Bansasine v.
BodelU 927 P.2d 675, at 676 (Utah App. 1996).
Mr. and Mrs. Fox admitted they did not know the exact stair upon which Mrs. Fox fell
and admitted that no one inspected the exact stair upon which Mrs. Fox fell, thus the causation of
her fall would have been left to the finder of fact's speculation.

Second Issue (Conclusions of Law)
The Court found, as a matter of law, that because there was no expert to opine as to
whether Mrs. Fox fell because of her symptomatic, pre-existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing,
knee that has lost cartilage, or for some other cause, that Mr. and Mrs. Fox could not sustain their
burden of proof as to causation. In Beard v. K-Mart Corporation, 12 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Utah
App. 2000), the Court held "... Beard argues that she was not required to put on expert medical
evidence. Beard claims that under Utah law, expert medical opinions are generally only required
in medical malpractice cases. We disagree."
The Beard court goes on to state at page 1019:
-16-

"The question as to whether such pain and injury resulted from the blow is within
the common knowledge and experience of lay witnesses and could be properly
submitted to the jury. What is missing in the evidence, however, is the link
between the injury suffered and the necessity of the surgeries. In Utah, in all but
the most obvious cases, testimony of lay witnesses regarding the need for specific
medical treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the jury. See generally
Denney v. St. Mark's Hosp, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968); Moore v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R. R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (Utah 1956);
Chief Consol Mining Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 P.2d 929 (1922).
"The need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the
defendants' negligent act and the plaintiffs injury depends upon the nature of the
injury. Where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond an
ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding,
there must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused the injury."
In this case there is neither expert medical testimony to establish a link between anything
BYU did and Mrs. Fox's alleged injuries, but there is no expert testimony to establish a causal
link between Mrs. Fox's fall and the treatment which she had. Whether or not she needed to
have a fixator placed on her leg is beyond the ken of a lay person.

Third Issue (Validity of Utah Code Ann., 78-27-33, as amended)
Mr. and Mrs. Fox objected to the testimony of the emergency medical service personnel
(Noah Converse and Scott Starr) and to the admission of the Utah EMS Incident Report and the
Brigham Young University Police Department EMS Incident Table with Accompanying Report
as exhibits, insofar as the testimony or the exhibits include a written or oral statement taken by
the emergency medical service personnel while attending Mrs. Fox on April 20, 2004. The
objection was based upon Utah Code Ann., §78-27-33, supra, a statutory rule evidence.
Article VIII, Section 4 [Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court - Judges pro tempore Regulation of practice of law], of the Utah Constitution grants to the Utah Supreme Court the
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right to adopt rules of evidence to be used in courts of the state of Utah. The Utah State
Legislature may amend the Rules of Evidence as adopted by the Supreme Court only by a vote of
two-thirds of all members of the Legislature. The Preliminary Note to the Utah Court Rules
states: "Any existing statutes inconsistent with these rules [of evidence], if and when these rules
are adopted by the Supreme Court, will be impliedly repealed."
The Utah Supreme Court ordered on September 10, 1985, in a Per Curiam decision:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as
amended, the court adopts all existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence
not inconsistent or superceded by rules of procedure and evidence heretofore
adopted by this court. Effective as of July 1, 1985.
Impliedly, the Utah Supreme Court does not adopt any existing statutory rules of
evidence which are inconsistent or superceded by the Utah Rules of Evidence. That being the
case, Section 78-27-33 is unconstitutional and has no force and effect.
CONCLUSION
BYU respectfully requests that the trial court be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2007.
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

THOMAS W. SEILER
Attorneys for Appellee
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SUPREME COURT

78-2-2

(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a
vacancy in t h a t office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme
Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by law.
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in
t h a t office no more t h a n two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief
justice as consistent with law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, c h . 247, § 1; 1986,
c h . 47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80,
§ 4.
Cross-References. — Chief justice, U t a h
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
Disqualification in particular case, U t a h
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
Judicial nomination and selection, Title 20A,
Chapter 12.

Membership on board of control of state law
library, § 9-7-301.
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy, § 78-721.
Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art
VIII, Sec. 7.
Retirement, U t a h Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 15;
Title 49, Chapters 17 and 18; §§ 78-8-103,
78-8-104.
Salary, U t a h Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 14.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h Law Review. — Note, Death Qualification and the Right to a n Impartial J u r y
Under the State Constitution: Capital J u r y
Selection in U t a h After State v. Young, 1995
U t a h L. Rev. 365.

78-2-1,5, 78-2-1.6.

A m . Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 67,
68.
C . J . S . — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.; 48A
C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85.

Repealed.

R e p e a l s . — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch.
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182,
§ 4.

Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981,
ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices,
was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court h a s original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court h a s original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court h a s appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of t h e Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by t h e Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
7
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(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the U t a h Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a
first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988,
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, c h . 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127,
§ 11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5;
1995, ch. 299, § 46; 1996, ch. 159, § 18; 2001,
ch. 302, § 1.
R e p e a l s and R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1986, ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as
enacted by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to
original appellate jurisdiction of Supreme
Court, and enacts the above section.

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, inserted "or
charge" in Subsection (3)(i) and made styHstic
changes.
Cross-References. — Chief justice to preside over impeachment of governor, § 77-5-2.
Election contest appeals, §§ 20A-4-406.
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const., Art. VIII,
Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B Utah R. App. P. 19.
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3.

78-2a-2

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
m Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L Rev 150

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing
fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election held
more t h a n three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter,
the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences
on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge
whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until a
successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of
Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per a n n u m or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of t h e presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, cfa. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Stare decisis.
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the
Court of Appeals governs all later cases mvolving the same legal issues decided by other

78-2a-3.

panels of that court and all courts of lower
rank Renn v Utah State Bd of Pardons, 904
P2d 677 (Utah 1995)

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
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(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of N a t u r a l
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the U t a h Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals h a s
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994,
c h . 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch.
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, c h . 255,
§ 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2001 amend-

ment by ch. 255, effective April 30, 2001, added
"parent-time" in Subsection (2)(h).
The 2001 amendment by ch. 302, effective
April 30, 2001, inserted "or charge" in Subsection (2)(e) and made stylistic changes.
This section has been reconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16.
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 801

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Testimony at trial.
Subdivision (a) provides that a court-appointed expert may be called as a trial witness,

but this is not mandatory Memam v Mernam,
799 R2d 1172 (Utah Ct App 1990)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Right of independent expert to
refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50
A.L.R.4th 680
Right of indigent defendant m state criminal
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes,
74 A.L.R 4th 330.
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal
case to assistance of chemist, toxicologist, tech-

nician, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical
specialist in substance analysis, 74 A.L R.4th
388.
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal
prosecution to ex parte in camera hearing on
request for state-funded expert witness, 83
A.L.R.5th 541.

ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other t h a n one made by the declarant
while testifying at t h e trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the t r u t h of
the m a t t e r asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(d)(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness
denies having made t h e statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut a n express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(d)(2) Admission
by party-opponent.
The statement is offered against a
party and is (A) t h e party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party h a s manifested
an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a m a t t e r within the scope of the agency
or employment, m a d e during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the
same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior
statements as substantive evidence if (l)inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and
does not require the prior statement to have

been given under oath or subject to perjury. The
former Utah rules admitted such statements as
an exception to the hearsay rule. See California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with respect to
confrontation problems under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,
Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court with the
addition of the language "or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten"
and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and
the actual effect on most juries,
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its
interpretation of the applicable rule in this

Rule 803
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Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant
immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness'
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification t h a t
complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda,
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel,
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

Rule 24
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Allegation of facts required
Allegation of prejudice required
Application
Purpose.
Cited.
A l l e g a t i o n of facts required.
Because defendant did not allege any facts m
support of his ineffective assistance claim, the
appellate court would not remand the case for
an evidentiary hearing It would be improper to
remand a claim under this rule for a fishing
expedition. State M Garrett, 849 P 2d 578 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P 943 (Utah 1993).

performed effectively. State v. Litherland, 2000
U T 7 6 , 12 P 3d 92.
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea in a murder trial was timely filed, the
matter was never adjudicated on the merits,
and the trial court retained jurisdiction; therefore, the Supreme Court amended the remand
to give the trial court jurisdiction to hear defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea on
the merits. State v. Lovell, 2005 UT 31,114 P.3d
575.

A l l e g a t i o n of prejudice required.
In hearing under this rule, criminal defendant has burden of showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and t h a t but for counsel's errors, a more favorable result would have been
obtained; defendant, convicted of raping his
daughter and sentenced to a term of 15 years to
life, failed to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel's ineffectiveness deprived him of
the ability to raise meritorious arguments on
appeal. State v. Reyes, 2001 UT 66, 31 P.3d 516.

Purpose.
A Rule 23B motion for remand is a specialized motion, available only in limited circumstances, to supplement the record with known
facts needed for an appellant to assert an
ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal, and if the facts already appearing in the
record are sufficient to make the claim, a remand is not needed. If defendant merely hopes
to discover evidence suggesting ineffectiveness,
a remand is not allowed, because the purpose of
the rule is not to hold a "mini-trial" on ineffectiveness of counsel. State v. Johnston, 2000 UT
App 290, 13 P.3d 175.

Application.
Under this rule, appellate courts need no
longer treat the question of an adequate record
as a necessary threshold issue; if the record is
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting from the inadequacy will be
construed in favor of a finding t h a t counsel

Cited in State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997), cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118
(Utah 1997); State v. Bredehoft, 966 P 2 d 285
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P 2 d 88
(Utah 1999); State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App
190, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 7; State v. Mecham,
2000 UT App 247, 9 P.3d 777.

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing t h a t the issue was preserved in the
trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved
in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
n a t u r e of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
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court decided that a gunshot was not within the scope of
the risk created by the driver's actions.

DISPOSITION:
The trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Affirmed.

OUTCOME: The court affirmed the summary judgment
in favor of the driver.

CASE SUMMARY:

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff guardian and
minor sought review of the decision of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Division I (Utah), which
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant driver
in the guardian and minor's action that alleged that the
negligence of the driver resulted in the death of the minor's father.
OVERVIEW: The driver was involved in an altercation
with another driver, and the other driver shot at the
driver's vehicle and the minor's father was killed. The
trial court concluded that the firing of the gun was an
intervening and superseding act that cut off any liability
of the driver. The court affirmed. The court held that the
only issue on appeal was whether the driver's reckless
driving was the proximate cause of the injury. On appeal
the guardian and minor claimed that the trial court erred
in its determination because the driver should have been
able to have foreseen that if he drove recklessly and
rudely, someone might have fired a weapon into his car,
injuring his passenger. The court held that the trial court
was correct when it determined that a reasonably jury
could not have found that the driver's actions were the
proximate cause of the death of the minor's father. The

Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards >
General Overview
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
General Overview
[HN1 ] Summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because
the issue of summary judgment is a question of law, an
appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented.

Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > General Overview
Torts > Negligence > Causation > General Overview
Torts > Negligence > Duty > General Overview
[HN2] A prima facie case of negligence requires proof of
four elements: (1) defendant owed plaintiff a duty of
care; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant's
breach of duty was the actual and proximate cause of
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plaintiffs injury; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as a
result of defendant's breach of duty.

Civil Procedure > Trials > Jury Trials > Province of
Court & Jury
Torts > Negligence > Causation > Proximate Cause >
Intervening Causation
[HN3] Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural
and .continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient causethe one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury. While proximate causation is generally an issue for the jury, a trial court may rule as a
matter of law on the issue if: (1) there is no evidence to
establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation to
jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons could
not differ on the inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation.

Torts > Negligence > General Overview
[HN4] A more recent negligent act may relieve the liability of a prior negligent actor under the proper circumstances.

Torts > Negligence > General Overview
[HN5] Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates
or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is
brought about through the intervention of another force
does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the
harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is not
within the scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct.
COUNSEL: Daniel F. Bertch, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
Lynn S. Davies and Kent W. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for
Appellees.
JUDGES: Before Judith M. Billings, Judge, James Z.
Davis, Associate Presiding Judge, Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge.
OPINION BY: JUDITH M. BILLINGS
OPINION
[*676] OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:

Plaintiff Somchay Bansasine, as guardian for P.K.,
appeals the trial court's summary judgment dismissing
her negligence claim against defendant Lang Rajsavong.
Specifically, Bansasine claims a reasonable juror could
find that Rajsavong's reckless driving was the actual and
proximate cause of a driver, angered by Rajsavong's
driving, shooting P.K.'s father, a passenger in Rajsavong's car. We affirm.
FACTS
Rajsavong was driving northbound on Interstate 15
with plaintiffs father when Lucas Bodell drove up close
behind them, blinding Rajsavong with his lights. Rajsavong changed lanes, letting Bodell pass. Angered at
being blinded, Rajsavong got behind Bodell [**2] and
flipped on his high beams. He then sped up, passed
Bodell, and changed back into the lane in which Bodell
was driving. In response, Bodell drove up parallel to
Rajsavong on the passenger side. Rajsavong then sped up
to seventy-five miles per hour only to have Bodell follow
suit. As Bodell caught up with Rajsavong, plaintiffs father made an obscene gesture at Bodell. Bodell pulled
out a gun and displayed it in his palm. Rajsavong sped
up in an effort to get away from Bodell. As Bodell drove
by in his truck, Rajsavong heard a "bang," and plaintiffs
father told Rajsavong that he had been shot. Rajsavong
took plaintiffs father to a hospital, where he later died.
Plaintiff brought suit against Rajsavong, claiming
Rajsavong's reckless driving resulted in the death of her
father. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming defendant's actions were not, as a matter of law,
the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. The trial court
granted the motion, concluding Bodell's firing of a gun
was an intervening and superseding act cutting off any
liability of Rajsavong. Plaintiff appeals.
ANALYSIS
[HN1] "Summary judgment is appropriate only
when no genuine issues of material fact [**3] exist and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 626-27
(Utah 1994). Because the issue of summary judgment is
a question of law, we review the trial court's decision for
correctness, giving "no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented." Id. at 627.
[HN2] A prima facie case of negligence requires
proof of four elements: (1) defendant owed plaintiff a
duty of care; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant's breach of duty was the actual and proximate cause
of plaintiffs injury; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as
a result of defendant's breach of duty. Clark v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598f 600-01 (Utah App. 1995). Defendant conceded, for purposes of summary judgment,
that he owed plaintiff a duty, he breached that duty, and
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plaintiff suffered injuries. Thus, the only issue on appeal
is whether defendant's "reckless driving" was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.
[HN3] Proximate cause is '""that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient
intervening cause), produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred. It is the [**4]
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation
the factors that accomplish the injury.'"" Id. (quoting
Mitchell v Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246-47 (Utah
1985) (quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 n.3
(Utah 1984))). While proximate causation is generally an
issue for the jury, a trial court may rule as a matter of law
on the issue if: '"(1) there is no evidence to establish a
causal connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons could not differ on
the inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation/" Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah App. 1991),
affd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)).

another driver on the road would fire a gun into his car
simply because he shined his high beams on that person,
passed him, then sped up as the driver tried to approach.3
If such a response were so common as to make it foreseeable, the streets and highways of this country would
be empty.
2
Plaintiff claims the following three cases
mandate that we determine it was error to take
this case from the jury: Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah
1996) (determining that when car dealership has
history of thefts and yet continues to keep keys in
cars and does nothing to improve security, it may
be foreseeable that a thief would steal a car, drive
recklessly while being pursued by police, and injure a bystander); Mitchell v. Pearson Enters.,
697 P.2d 240, 246-47 (Utah 1985) (holding on
proper facts hotel's inaction in providing security
could be proximate cause of wrongful death of
patron killed by intruder); Steffensen v. Smith's
Management Corp. 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah
App. 1991) (concluding injury to customer during
chase of shoplifter could be a foreseeable consequence of negligent training of personnel in pursuit of shoplifters), affd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah
1993). While we agree that these cases help set
the parameter of the law dealing with proximate
cause in the context of summary judgment, we
find all three cases distinguishable. In each of the
three cases the specific facts of each case could
lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the actions resulting from the defendants' negligence
were not extraordinary and hence, were foreseeable. In this case, however, we conclude the
shooting was an extraordinary reaction to rude
driving, thereby making the result unforeseeable.

[*677] In the instant case, the trial court ruled that
reasonable persons could not disagree that Bodell's intentional (or negligent) l firing of a gun at plaintiffs father
was an intervening and superseding cause which cut off
any responsibility of defendant. On appeal, plaintiff
claims the trial court erred in making this determination
because defendant should have been able to foresee that
if he drove recklessly and rudely, someone might fire a
weapon into [**5] his car, injuring his passenger. We
disagree.
1
As alternative causes of action, plaintiff
claimed both that the gun was fired intentionally
and that it was fired accidentally.
Utah courts have consistently recognized that [HN4]
'"a more recent negligent [or criminal/intentional] act
may . . . relieve the liability of a prior negligent actor
under the proper circumstances.1" Steffensen, 820 P.2d at
488 (citation omitted). These circumstances arise when
the more recent negligent or criminal act was unforeseeable to the first negligent actor. Id. If, on the other hand,
the subsequent criminal or negligent act was "foreseeable
to the prior actor, both acts are concurring causes and the
prior actor is not absolved of liability." Id; see also
Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246 (Utah 1985). Thus, the question becomes whether Rajsavong could reasonably have
foreseen plaintiffs father being shot as a result of his
alleged "reckless" and rude driving.
We conclude the trial court was correct in determining that [**6] a reasonable juror could not have found
that defendant's driving was the proximate cause of the
death of plaintiffs father. 2 We agree that a reasonable
juror could not find that defendant should foresee that

[**7]
3 We express no opinion as to the added effect
of an obscene gesture in relation to the facts of
this case with the exception of noting that it was
the plaintiffs father who made the obscene gesture to the shooter, and that it was this gesture
that immediately precipitated the shooter brandishing the gun.
Plaintiff next claims that it is enough to prove only
that defendant could have foreseen the general risk of
harm that occurred. Specifically, plaintiff argues that
defendant could reasonably foresee that aggressive behavior of some kind might be a response to his rude driving, which is exactly what occurred although the specific
action was different from what might reasonably be expected, i.e, a car accident or running the defendant off
the road. While we agree that "only the general nature of
the injury need be foreseeable," Steffensen v. Smith's
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Management Corp, 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993),
plaintiff goes too far in defining what "general nature"
means. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B
(1965) states:
[HN5] Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the [**8] risk of a particular harm and
is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that
the harm is brought about through the intervention of
another force does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally caused by a third
person and is [*678] not within the scope of the risk
created by the actor's conduct.
(Emphasis added.) Although we recognize that
many aspects of today's society are becoming more violent and confrontational, we cannot conclude that a gunshot is within the scope of the risk created by defendant's
rude and reckless driving.
Finally, plaintiff argues that defendant only needed
to be able to foresee the injury that occurred, i.e., death,
and not the specific means that caused that injury. In
particular, plaintiff claims that because death was a foreseeable outcome of reckless driving—such as through a
collision or being run off the road--it does not matter that
the death resulted from a gunshot. Plaintiff misperceives
the law. While plaintiff again correctly states that only
the "general nature of the injury need be foreseeable,"
Steffensen, 862 P 2d at 1346, plaintiff misunderstands its

meaning. In this case, the general nature [**9] of the
injury is not death. Rather, death is the result of the injury; the injury was a gunshot wound. Thus, as above, for
plaintiff to prevail, defendant must have been able to
foresee that his reckless driving might lead to a shooting.
As previously stated, defendant could not have foreseen
this result, and thus, his reckless driving could not have
been the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly held that under the facts of
this case, defendant could not have foreseen that his
"reckless driving" would lead to another driver firing a
weapon into his car. As such, the trial court properly
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. We
therefore affirm.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
CONCUR BY: JAMES Z. DAVIS, PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD.
CONCUR
WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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OPINION
[**1016] BILLINGS, Judge:
[*P1] Defendant/appellant K-Mart Corporation (KMart) appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for a
partial directed verdict. We reverse and remand for a
new trial.
FACTS
[*P2] On September 15, 1996, plaintiff/appellee
Darlene Beard (Beard) was injured in a K-Mart store
when a K-Mart employee struck her in the head with his
elbow as he attempted to start a lawnmower. As she fell
toward the floor, she felt a severe headache, as well as
pain in her wrists, knee, and ankle. She visited her doctor
the following day, complaining of head, neck, knee, and
foot pain, and continued to have severe headaches, a sore
neck, aching hands, and leg and foot pain. Beard saw a
number of doctors and ultimately underwent a number of
surgeries. Beard sued K-Mart for its employee's [***2]
negligence in striking her. Three surgeries, performed on

her neck and wrists by Dr. Robert Peterson, are at issue
in this appeal. K-Mart asserts these surgeries are not
causally connected to the accident at its store.
[*P3] At trial, Beard testified that her neck and
wrist problems began when she was struck in the head at
K-Mart. In addition, her family physician and her surgeon Dr. Peterson testified "there was a chronologic association for the time of the incident [at K-Mart] to the
time of the onset of symptoms." However, Dr. Peterson
testified that he could not say to a degree of reasonable
medical probability that the accident at K-Mart caused
the need for either her neck or wrist surgeries.
[*P4] At the close of Beard's case, K-Mart moved
for a partial directed verdict, arguing Beard had not presented sufficient evidence [**1017] to permit the jury
to find that her need for the neck and wrist surgeries was
the proximate result of the injuries she had suffered at KMart. ' The trial court denied K-Mart's motion, and the
jury awarded Beard $ 431,290.22 in damages.
1 Both parties characterize K-Mart's motion as
one for a directed verdict; however, the motion
was effectively one requesting a jury instruction
excluding consideration of the evidence regarding
the neck and wrist surgeries.
[***3] STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P5] "When reviewing any challenge to a trial
court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, we review
'"the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may
fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if
reasonable minds could disagree with the ground as-
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serted for directing a verdict."'" Mahmoodv. Ross, 1999
UT 104, PI6, 990 P. 2d 933 (quoting White v. Fox, 665
P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983) (quoting CookAssocs., Inc.
v Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983))). If we
conclude Beard did raise a material fact precluding
judgment against her as a matter of law, we must affirm
the trial court's denial of K-Mart's motion and uphold the
jury's verdict. See id.
ANALYSIS
[*P6] K-Mart argues Beard failed to present expert
medical testimony establishing that her need for neck
and wrist surgeries was caused by K-Mart's negligence.
The essence of K-Mart's argument is that Beard's own
testimony and the general testimony of her doctors that
she did not suffer neck and wrist complaints before the
injury at K-Mart is insufficient [***4] as a matter of law
to allow the jury to consider whether these surgeries
were a result of K-Mart's negligence. K-Mart argues that
only expert medical testimony that the need for her surgeries was proximately caused by K-Mart's negligence
will suffice. Thus, K-Mart argues the trial court erred in
not directing a verdict in its favor and removing this evidence from the jury's consideration.
[*P7] K-Mart relies on Denney v. St. Mark's Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968), for the proposition that "if the expert evidence offered on the issue of
medical causation is simply that a particular injury could
have resulted from a particular accident, but not that it
probably did, such testimony is insufficient for submission of the issue to the jury." In Denney, the plaintiff had
undergone neck surgery and was having x-rays taken of
her lumbar spine for unrelated treatment when a medical
technician forcefully pushed her neck close to her knees,
allegedly causing a feeling like an electric shock in the
back of her neck. See Denney, 442 P.2d at 944-45. Two
days later, she suffered a stroke. See id. More than four
months later, the [***5] plaintiff told her neurologist
that her neck had been forced forward during the spinal
x-rays. See id. The following year, a spinal fusion was
performed and a neck nerve severed to relieve pain. See
id. The plaintiff alleged the x-ray technician's negligence
was responsible for her ailments. See id. At trial, she
testified as to the feeling in her neck when the technician
pushed on it, and to continuing pain, numbness, and loss
of vision after the incident. See id. Additionally, her neurologist testified that the force used by the technician
could cause disc problems, but on cross-examination
admitted it was a "medical probability" that her ailments
were the result of the stroke. Id.
[*P8] The Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial
court's directed verdict in favor of the hospital. See id. at
946. The court stated:

in those cases which depend upon knowledge of the
scientific effect of medicine, the results of surgery, or
whether the attending physician exercised the ordinary
care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the
community which he serves, must ordinarily be established by the testimony of physicians and surgeons.

The only facts [***6] in the instant case which may
be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses of a lay
witness are that the technician moved plaintiffs body,
and that the back of her head hurt. No lay witness
[**1018] can by the ordinary use of his senses say that
the complaints of the plaintiff, including the hurting in
the back of her head, was caused by this claimed adjustment of her position on the x-ray table.
Id. (quoting Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 387,
227 P.2d 772, 774 (1951)). The court concluded that the
plaintiffs evidence did not show that her injuries were
the result of the negligence of the technician. See 442
P.2dat947.
[*P9] K-Mart also relies on Moore v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 255, 292
P.2d 849 (1956). In Moore, the plaintiffs doctor testified
that "it was possible" that plaintiffs accident had caused
a ruptured lumbar disc and nerve pressure. 292 P.2d at
850. The doctor estimated a five percent permanent disability "based in part on the predictability of exacerbation and remission of pain" over time. Id. The defendant
moved to strike the doctor's testimony, arguing that "possibilities" [***7] were not probative, but the trial court
denied the motion. Id. An instruction taking consideration of a ruptured disc from the jury on the basis that no
competent evidence had been given on the matter was
likewise refused by the trial court. See id.
[*P10] On appeal, the defendant argued that the
doctor's testimony was "insufficient to provide a question
of the existence of an injured disc." Id. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that the doctor's testimony regarding the permanency of the plaintiffs disability was
"linked to the possibility of a disc injury" and was a significant part of the plaintiffs case. Id. The court stated:
"Under these circumstances, if the proof of such an injury falls short of that required under our law, then an
instruction to that effect should have been given the
jury." Id. at 850-51. The court noted that under longstanding Utah law, a "plaintiff retains the burden of proving his damages by competent evidence to an extent
where the trier of fact could discover that which is
probably true." Id. at 851 (emphasis added). The court
agreed with the plaintiff that there was evidence of some
injury, but stated:
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the jury [***8] was allowed to speculate upon the
existence of a disc injury, which may be determinative of
the important element of permanency of the injury when
no affirmative evidence was offered on this issue. Although the medical testimony indicated that the symptoms showed a nerve irritation, and that such symptoms
were consistent with the existence of a disc injury, we
cannot discover in the witness' words anything more than
their corollary that, under the circumstances a disc injury
was not impossible.
Id. at 259, 292 P.2d at 851. Because there was a
strong likelihood the jury considered the permanency of
the injury to have been proven by expert testimony, the
court reversed the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
holding that a limiting instruction should have been
given. See id.
[*P11] In the instant case, K-Mart argues that although Beard testified her neck and wrist problems began at the time of her injury at K-Mart, her belief that her
neck and wrist surgeries were, therefore, the result of that
incident cannot overcome the failure of the medical evidence to substantiate that belief.
[*P12] In contrast, Beard argues she was not required to put on [***9] expert medical evidence. Beard
claims that under Utah law, expert medical opinions are
generally only required in medical malpractice cases. We
disagree.
[*P13] Beard presents cases from other jurisdictions
holding that expert medical testimony is not required to
submit to the jury questions about the need for medical
treatment and expenses. See, e.g., Jordan v. Smoot, 191
Ga. App. 74, 380 S.E.2d 714, 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989);
Polaco v. Smith, 376 So. 2d 409, 409-10 (Fla. Ct. App.
1979); Walton v. Gallbraith, 15 Mich. App. 490, 166
N.W.2d 605, 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969). However, we
conclude these cases are factually distinguishable as they
involve medical damages within the common experience
of a layperson.
[*P14] In Smoot, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
injuries she sustained in an automobile collision. See 380
S.E.2d at 714. Her case consisted of "her testimony and
that of the responding police officer, pictures of her
damaged car, and her medical bill." Id. The [**1019]
plaintiff testified that she visited a chiropractor the day of
the accident and following the accident and that the
[***10] chiropractic treatments had given her relief. See
id. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant "on
the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie
personal injury case because she had not introduced expert medical testimony" connecting the collision and her
injuries. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, stating "where, as here, there is no significant lapse of time

between the injury sustained and the onset of the physical condition for which the injured party seeks compensation, and the injury sustained is a matter which jurors
must be credited with knowing by reason of common
knowledge, expert medical testimony is not required." Id.
(emphasis added).
[*P15] Beard also relies on Walton v. Gallbraith, 15
Mich. App. 490, 166N.W.2d 605 (Mick Ct. App. 1969).
In Walton, the plaintiff sued the defendant for neck,
back, and shoulder injuries caused by a car accident. See
166 N. W.2d at 605. At trial, no physician testified for the
plaintiff, and the defendant "objected to the admission
into evidence of bills for medicine and treatment on the
ground that there was no showing that they were causally
connected with the . . . [***11] accident." Id. The defendant also requested an instruction to exclude the jury's
consideration of the bills. See id. The trial court denied
both motions, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $ 3500
in damages. See id. On appeal, the defendant argued it
was error to introduce plaintiffs medical bills. See id.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued "that a causal
connection between the accident and the injury may be
shown without expert testimony." Id. at 605-06. The
court stated:
A brief review of the function of the jury leads us to
the conclusion that plaintiffs position is the correct one.
Her testimony emphasizes the facts that there were no
previous neck or back pains and that they began the day
after the accident.
In a situation such as this, // should be clear to men
of common experience that the cause of the injuries was
the accident and no expert was needed to demonstrate
this fact.
Id. at 606 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court
sustained the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. See
id.
[*P16] In this case, the question is not whether the
accident at K- Mart caused Beard injury, but rather
whether injuries sustained [***12] as a result of the accident at K-Mart required the neurological surgeries performed on Beard's neck and wrists. Beard was properly
permitted to testify that the accident in the store caused
pain and injury. The question as to whether such pain
and injury resulted from the blow is within the common
knowledge and experience of lay witnesses and could
properly be submitted to the jury. What is missing in the
evidence, however, is the link between the injuries suffered and the necessity of the surgeries. In Utah, in all
but the most obvious cases, testimony of lay witnesses
regarding the need for specific medical treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the jury. See generally
Denney v. St. Mark's Hosp., 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d
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944 (J968); Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R R.
Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (Utah 1956); Chief
Consol Mining Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 P 929
(1922). Certainly whether the need for complex neurological surgery was a result of the accident at K-Mart is
not within the common experience of laypersons. As
stated in Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 44 Wn. App.
244, 722P.2d819, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986): [***13]
The need for positive expert testimony to establish a
causal link* between the defendants' negligent act and the
plaintiffs injury depends upon the nature of the injury.
Where the injury involves obscure medical factors which
are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding, there must be
expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused
the injury.
722 P. 2d at 824. "The diagnosis and potential continuance of a disease are medical questions to be established
by physicians as expert witnesses and not by lay persons." Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App.
516, 352 S.E.2d832, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). Thus, we
conclude expert testimony on this medical causation issue was required before the issue [**1020] of damages
arising from these surgeries was submitted to the jury.
[*P17] Plaintiff alternatively contends that even if
she was required to put on expert medical testimony that
her need for neck and wrist surgeries was caused by the
accident at K-Mart, she introduced adequate expert
medical testimony.
[*P18] Dr. Peterson, the surgeon who performed
Beard's neck surgery and both wrist surgeries, [***14]
testified extensively regarding the causes of Beard's neck
pain, wrist pain, and his surgical treatment of them:
A: The question is, you know, what the cause is. The
answer is, basically, I have no way of proving anything.
But the association is that Mrs. Beard came to me and ~
and, more or less, was a person who was doing well prior
to this incident at K-Mart and since that time has been
suffering a rather significant problem which could be ~
you know, which was associated with some significant
anatomic compromise in her neck. And from my standpoint, there was a chronologic association from the time
of the incident to the time of the onset of the symptoms.
Q [by Beard's counsel]: What do you mean by
chronological association?
A: Happened at the same time. . . . To my knowledge, [Beard] did not have these complaints prior to being hit at K-Mart.

Q: Can you interpret for us what you found on the
MRI?...
A: Bone spur.
Q: What causes bone spurs?
A: Well, sort of the same thing that causes a bunion,
irritation, disk - an old disk herniation which has receded, abnormal movement, local irritation.
Q: Is that also the aging process as well?
A: Being on a planet [*** 15] with gravity.

Q [by K-Mart's counsel]: You performed neck surgery on Darlene Beard because she had marginal osteophytes in her neck, bone spurs.
A: That's essentially correct.
Q: Those were pre-existing to September 15, 1996.
A: That would be my best guess.
Q: In fact, you termed, in your deposition, that as a
severe form of degenerative disk disease; is that correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: All of that was pre-existing long before this ItMart incident ever happened?
A: No argument.
Q: Do you know how long?
A: Have no idea.
Q: Do you know how they got there?
A: As mentioned previously in testimony, it is essentially concomitant with being on a planet with gravity
long enough. But it has to do with local irritation and
other potential compromises such as trauma.
Q: You don't know whether it was trauma, whether it
was heredity, whether it was wear and tear, whether it
was gravity — as to how those bone spurs got there.
A: Absolutely no idea.

Q: And you're not saying to the jury, to a degree of
reasonable medical probability, that this incident at KMart caused such a condition in her neck: isn't that correct?
A: No, Fm not telling [*** 16] the jury that at all.
Q: You just don't know, do you?
A: No.
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[*P19] When questioned about the wrist surgery,
Dr. Peterson testified:
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that any other
incident, other than the accident of 9-15-96, may have
caused this condition?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Could trauma cause that
A: Trauma — trauma can cause carpal tunnel syndrome. At least certainly aggravate pre-existing condition.

Q: Okay. And so, you're not telling the jury, again,
to any degree of reasonable probability that her carpal
tunnel was caused by this incident at K-Mart; isn't that
correct?
A: That's correct.
[**1021] [*P20] We simply cannot say from the
record before us that the expert medical testimony was
sufficient to allow the jury to consider whether Beard's
surgeries were necessitated by K-Maif s negligence and
if so what damage she suffered as a result of those sur-

geries. 2 Without the required expert medical opinion
linking the injury to the necessity of the surgery, a jury
would simply be speculating about a linkage that is beyond its knowledge and experience. The expert medical
testimony merely established a chronological [***17]
relationship between the accident and her symptoms. No
expert medical testimony was received that the neck and
wrist surgeries were necessitated by her accident. Thus,
it was error for the trial judge not to grant a directed verdict removing these issues from the jury. Therefore we
must reverse and remand for a new trial.
2
Counsel for K-Mart conceded and we conclude that Beard will have an opportunity on remand to offer competent expert medical testimony on the issue of whether the accident at KMart either caused the need for her neck and
wrist surgeries or exacerbated a pre-existing condition which necessitated the surgeries.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
[*P21] WE CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
William A. Thome, Jr., Judge
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OPINION
[**1150] RUSSON, Justice:
[*P1] Emery County and the City of Green River
("Green River") appeal the trial court's declaratory judgment in favor of Grand County declaring that section 172-6(2) of the Utah Code is unconstitutional under article
XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution, and appeal the
trial court's failure to certify the election results approving Emery County's annexation of that portion of Green
River located within Grand County ("Green River portion of Grand County") pursuant to their petition for
election review. Grand County cross-appeals the trial
court's grant of Emery County and Green River's petition

[*P2] This appeal arises out of a long-standing controversy between neighboring Grand County and Emery
County and Green River, which straddles those counties'
common border. The Green River portion of Grand
County, with the consent and encouragement of Emery
County, petitioned the relevant county legislative bodies
to be annexed by Emery County, the desired result being
that all of Green River would be located in Emery
County instead of spread across two counties. These
same parties were before this court in 1998 in connection
with the same underlying controversy. In that case,
Grand County v. Emery County, 969 P.2d 421 (Utah
1998), Grand County successfully challenged a previous
version of section 17-2-6, the statute at issue in this appeal, in an attempt to thwart Emery County's annexation
of the Green River portion of Grand County. While the
underlying controversy between the counties remains the
same, the statutory framework within which the battle
rages has been changed by the Utah Legislature through
the subsequent enactment of House Bill 49 ("H.B. 49"),
H.B. 49, 53d Leg., Gen. Sess., 2000 Utah Laws 115,
during the 2000 [***3] general session. The constitutionality of the amended statutory scheme is the central
subject of this appeal.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[*P3] On August 3, 2000, Grand County filed an
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
Emery County and Green River related to Emery

Page 2
2002 UT 57, *; 52 P.3d 1148, **;
450 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; 2002 Utah LEXIS 84, ***
County's attempt to annex the Green River portion of
Grand County. On September 1, 2000, Grand County
moved for a preliminary injunction in an effort to prevent
Emery County and Green River's annexation proposal
from being submitted to the voters of Emery County and
the voters of the Green River portion of Grand County.
The trial court denied Grand County's motion for injunctive relief but directed any party wishing to challenge the
results of the election to petition for election review at
the appropriate time after the election. The annexation
proposal was submitted [**1151] to the relevant voters
in the 2000 general election.
[*P4] After the election, Grand County refused to
certify the election with regard to the annexation proposal. Emery County and Green River petitioned for
election review on December 1, 2000, to compel certification of the voters' approval of the annexation proposal.
The trial [***4] court consolidated Grand County's
original action for declaratory judgment with the petition
for election review.
[*P5] On December 14, 2000, the trial court
granted Emery County and Green River's petition for
election review and determined that the relevant annexation statute, sections 17-2-6 and -8 of the Utah Code,
requires approval of an annexation proposal by a majority of the voters in the area of the city or town to be annexed and the annexing county, and that in the 2000 general election, a majority of the voters in Emery County
and the Green River portion of Grand County had approved the proposal. Despite this determination, the trial
court refused to certify the election results because it
simultaneously held section 17-2-6(2) of the Utah Code,
the statute pursuant to which the election was held, unconstitutional, and consequently, granted Grand County
its requested declaratory relief. The trial court ruled that
section 17-2-6(2) of the Utah Code was unconstitutional
because it violated the "general law" provision of article
XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution. The parties timely
appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P6] The issue of "whether a statute is constitutional [***5] is a question of law, which we review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court." State
v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, P30, 40 P. 3d 611; see also State
v. Kell, 2002 UT 19, P5Q,
P.3d
; Grand County v.
Emery County, 969 P.2d 421, 422 (Utah 1998). Furthermore, to the extent we are making a determination of a
statute's constitutionality, the '"statute is presumed constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor
of constitutionality.'" Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of
Educ, 2001 UT2, P 9, 17 P. 3d 1125 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Daniels, 2002 UT2 at P30. Additionally, because interpreting the Utah Constitution pre-

sents a question of law, we review the trial court's determination for correctness and give no deference to its
legal conclusions. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, PI9, 44
P. 3d 756; Cache County v. Prop. Div. of State Tax
Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 766 (Utah 1996).
ANALYSIS
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANNEXATION
STATUTE
[*P7] On appeal, Emery County and Green River
first argue that the trial court erred in [***6] granting
Grand County declaratory judgment that section 17-26(2) is unconstitutional. In ruling that section 17-2-6(2)
is unconstitutional, the trial court concluded that section
17-2-6(2/s requirement—that a county wishing to annex
a portion of the territory from an adjoining county must
first acquire a concurrent resolution passed by a twothirds majority of both houses of the legislature approving the annexation proposal and then the governor's signature approval on such a resolution-violated the "general law" provision of article XI, section 3 of the Utah
Constitution, which establishes the general procedure
and voting requirement regarding county annexations
and the legislature's power to delineate the conditions of
the annexation process. See Utah Const, art. XI, § 3.
[*P8] Emery County and Green River maintain that
section 17-2-6(2), H.B. 49, which amended section 17-26, and House Concurrent Resolution 6, H. Con. Res. 6,
53d Leg., Gen. Sess., 2000 Utah Laws 1660-61-the
resolution passed by the legislature approving the annexation proposal—either are not "special laws," or in the
case of the concurrent resolution, is not a "law" at all,
and therefore, they do [***7] not violate article XI, section 3.
[*P9] Article XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
No territory shall be stricken from any county unless
a majority of the voters living in such territory, as well as
of the county to which it is to be annexed, shall vote
therefor, and then only under such [**1152] conditions
as may be prescribed by general law.
Utah Const, art. XI, § 3.
[*P10] This provision sets forth the basic requirements and framework for annexation and delegates to the
legislature the authority to dictate the conditions under
which annexation may occur. However, the legislature's
power to set those conditions is limited by the provision
in that the legislature may prescribe such conditions only
"by general law." Id.
[*P11] Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the
legislature enacted title 17, chapter 2 of the Utah Code.
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Specifically, section 17-2-6 prescribes the conditions
under which one county can annex a portion of the territory of an adjoining county. This section of the statute
sets forth two different annexation methods.
[*P12] The first annexation method (the "traditional method") allows for a majority of the voters in
[***8] an area of a county to petition their county legislative body to allow the area in which they live to be
annexed by an adjoining county. Utah Code Ann. §172-6(1)(a). The county legislative body, upon receiving
such a petition in accordance with the provisions of the
statute, must submit the annexation proposal to the voters
of the county from which territory is to be annexed and
to the voters of the county to which the territory is to be
annexed. Id. § 17-2-6(1)(b). Under this annexation
method, an annexation proposal is approved if "a majority of those voting in each county have voted in favor of
[the] annexation." Id. § 17-2-8(2)(a) (Supp. 2001).
[*P13] The second or alternative annexation
method (the "amended alternative method"), which is at
issue in this case, was amended by the passage of H.B.
49 during the 2000 general session of the legislature. The
amended alternative method provides for a similar petition process but goes further and sets forth a modified
and supplemental procedure applicable where the area
seeking to be annexed shares a common boundary with
the annexing county and where the area proposed to be
annexed (1) "is [***9] located within a city or town
whose boundaries extend into the proposed annexing
county," (2) "is contiguous to the portion of the city or
town that is located within the proposed annexing
county," and (3) "includes all of the city or town that is
within the county from which the area is proposed to be
taken." Utah Code Ann. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(i)(A)-(C). Under
these circumstances, one county can annex a portion of
an adjoining county if "by a two-thirds vote of each
house, the Legislature passes a concurrent resolution"
approving the annexation proposal, id. § 17-2-6(2) (a) (ii),
the governor signs the concurrent resolution, id. § 17-26(2)(a)(Hi), and an economic analysis of the annexation
proposal is conducted and the analysis demonstrates that
the cost and revenue effects of the annexation proposal
fall within the specific parameters described in the statute, id. § 17-2-6(2)(b). In an election on an annexation
proposal brought under the amended alternative method,
an annexation proposal is approved if "a majority of voters living in the area proposed for annexation" and "a
majority of voters living in the county to which the area
is proposed to [***10] be annexed have voted in favor
of annexation." Id § 17-2-8(2) (b).
[*P14] In order to determine if section 17-2-6, as
amended by H.B. 49, is constitutional under article XI,
section 3, we must determine if it is a general law. The
standards for evaluating challenged legislation under the

"general law" provisions of the Utah Constitution are set
forth in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Ass fn:
A general law applies to and operates uniformly upon all
members of any class of persons, places, or things requiring legislation particular to themselves in the matters
covered by the laws in question. On the other hand, special legislation relates either to particular persons, places,
or things or to persons, places, or things which, though
not particularized, are separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the law might, but for
such legislation, be applied. . . . The constitutional prohibition of special legislation does not preclude legislative
classification, but only requires the classification to be
reasonable.
[**1153] 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977); see also 73
Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 5 (1974). Furthermore, [***11]
where the legislature has made such a legislative classification, the classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as
there is some basis for the differentiation between classes
or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, provided the differentiation
bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the a c t . . . .

. . . If a reasonable basis to differentiate those included from those excluded from its operation can be
found, it must be held constitutional.
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 564 P.2d at 755-56
(quotations omitted). In other words, a law is a general
law where, to the extent it makes a classification, that
classification (1) is reasonable and (2) applies and operates uniformly as to all members composing the class.
[*P15] Section 17-2-6, as amended by H.B. 49, is a
general law. It is clear that the amended alternative
method provided for in section 17-2-6(2) creates a legislative classification and differentiates between portions
of counties generally and those portions that are cities or
towns that straddle county boundaries. Neither of
[***12] the parties disputes the reasonableness of this
classification.
[*P16] While the plain language of H.B. 49 does
not provide an express indication of the legislature's basis for differentiating between portions of counties generally that seek annexation and those areas of counties
that are portions of cities or towns that straddle county
lines that seek annexation, and there does not appear to
be any legislative history associated with H.B. 49 to
guide us, it is not difficult to discern from the language
of the bill and the statute that the legislature was con-
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cerned about keeping cities and towns wholly within a
single county instead of two counties. The cities and
towns belonging to the class occupy the unique position
of straddling a county boundary and falling within two
counties. ' The purpose of the legislation is to provide an
additional, and in some respects easier, method of annexation for the cities and towns caught in the awkward
position of straddling a county line. The legislature did
not arbitrarily include or exclude members from the class
to which the statute is applicable, but instead, included
only members to which the purpose of the statute might
apply. Therefore, [***13] the legislature's basis for differentiating between the members of the class subject to
section 17-2-6(2) and other portions of counties in general "bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be
accomplished by the act" and is otherwise reasonable.
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 564 P.2d at 756.
1 There are presently four cities/towns that fall
into the class created by the statute. While the
number of members of the class may be relatively
small, this does not render the law in question
"special." 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 10 (1974).
Moreover, as populations grow and shift, and as
cities and communities expand, new members of
the class may come into existence.
[*P17] As to the "uniform operation" requirement
for general laws, Grand County essentially argues that
section 17-2-6(2) was enacted specifically to address the
Green River situation and that the statute will not operate
uniformly as to the other members of the class because
the statute includes no legal standards related to [***14]
the passage of a concurrent resolution by the legislature
or approval of such a resolution by the governor. Grand
County argues that under the statutory scheme as it now
stands, there is no guarantee that any of the other class
members will be able to successfully lobby the legislature and the governor for passage and approval of a concurrent resolution similar to the one secured by Emery
County and Green River in this case. Grand County's
arguments are unavailing.
[*P18] Section 17-2-6(2) applies uniformly to the
members of the class. As previously indicated, there are
four cities/towns that are presently members of the class.
One of those class members, Green River, has successfully employed the procedure provided for in the statute.
Any of the other class members may utilize the section
17-2-6(2) procedures in the same manner as Green River
did. Under the uniform operation of the statute, those
class members would be [**1154] required to lobby the
legislature for a concurrent resolution, to secure the governor's signature of such a resolution, to conduct the required economic analysis, and ultimately to gain the approval of a majority of the voters living in the appropri-

ate areas. [***15] The procedure for the class members
is identical. Green River was afforded no special treatment in the application of the law, and there is no indication that any other class member would be treated any
differently or required to meet any disparate burdens.
The mere fact that Emery County and Green River were
successful in utilizing the amended alternative method
does not render the statute a special law.
[*P19] Grand County further argues that even if the
underlying annexation statute is a general law, the concurrent resolution passed by the legislature and signed by
the governor is a special law, or has the effect of a special law, since such a resolution is required by the underlying statute and no vote on annexation can go forward
without the resolution. The trial court appeared to endorse essentially the same argument when it concluded
in its memorandum decision that the "concurrent resolution approved by the Governor is functionally indistinguishable from legislation." We disagree.
[*P20] The concurrent resolution is not a "law" and
therefore is not subject to the "general law" limiting language of article XI, section 3 because a resolution of the
Utah Legislature [***16] is not legislation and does not
have the force or effect of law. Salt Lake City v. State
Tax Comm'n, 813 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1991); 73 Am.
Jur. 2d Statutes § 3 (1974) ("The general rule is that a
joint or concurrent resolution adopted by the legislature
is not a statute, [and] does not have the force or effect of
law . . ..").
[*P21] Nor does the requirement of a concurrent
resolution passed by the legislature and signed by the
governor transform the underlying general law into a
special one. The concurrent resolution required as part of
the amended alternative method has no effect of law. It
neither grants nor denies annexation to a city or town or
county. It merely represents a condition precedent to an
annexation proposal brought under the amended alternative method being presented to the relevant voters in the
county or area to be annexed. Article XI, section 3 of the
Utah Constitution clearly indicates that such conditions
may be set by the legislature.
[*P22] Finally, in its memorandum decision the
trial court characterized the requirement of a concurrent
resolution as giving the "last word on any county boundary change" to the legislature [***17] and the governor
instead of to the voters. This is incorrect.
[*P23] We read the plain language of the statute
"as a whole," interpreting its provisions "in harmony
with other provisions in the same statute and 'with other
statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Lyon v.
Burton, 2000 UT 19, P17, 5 P.3d 616 (quoting Roberts v.
Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (per curiam)).
The trial court's analysis and conclusion ignore the pres-
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ence of the traditional method in section 17-2-6(1). The
concurrent resolution requirement does not give the legislature and the governor the "last word" on county
boundary changes because a city or town that is unsuccessful in utilizing the procedures of the amended alternative method in section 17-2-6(2) by not acquiring a
concurrent resolution from the legislature, or for that
matter, an economic analysis that meets the requirements
of the amended alternative method, would always have
recourse to the traditional method found in section 17-26(1), which is free from all of the additional requirements of the amended alternative method.
[*P24] Therefore, the trial court erred when it concluded as [*** 18] a matter of law that section 17-2-6, as
amended by H.B. 49, was an unconstitutional "special
law" because the legislative classification made by the
statute has a reasonable basis that is reasonably related to
the purposes of the statute and because the statute applies
and operates uniformly as to the members of the class.
II. INTERPRETATION OF "VOTERS"
[*P25] On cross-appeal, Grand County challenges
the trial court's conclusion that section 17-2-8 of the Utah
Code requires that an [**1155] annexation proposal
brought pursuant to section 17-2-6(2) receive a majority
of the votes of those who actually voted on the annexation proposal in the area to be annexed and in the annexing county in order to be approved. Emery County and
Green River appeal the trial court's refusal to certify the
result of the election in accordance with the trial court's
interpretation of the statute and its determination that the
annexation proposal received the required electoral approval.
[*P26] Grand County argues that the statute should
be interpreted to require that an annexation proposal
brought under section 17-2-6(2) receive a majority of the
votes of "registered" voters in the area to be annexed
[***19] and in the annexing county in order to be approved. Grand County supports its position by noting
that the legislature amended the language of section 172-8(2) (b) that sets forth the standard for approval of an
annexation proposal brought pursuant to section 17-26(2). Prior to the legislature's amendment of section 172-8(2)(b) through the enactment of H.B. 49, the standard
of approval for an annexation proposal brought pursuant
to either subsection 17-2-6(1) or subsection 17-2-6(2)
was the same "majority of those voting" standard. The
amendment altered the language setting forth the approval standard for section 17-2-6(2) annexation proposals from a majority of "those voting" in the area proposed
for annexation and in the county to which the area is to
be annexed, Utah Code Ann. § 17-2-8(2)(b) (1999), to a
majority of "voters living" in those two areas, Utah Code
Ann. § 17-2-8(2)(b) (Supp. 2001). Grand County argues

that the legislature amended the language of the statute to
require approval of a majority of "voters living" in the
relevant areas in order to impose a higher standard than
the majority of "those voting" requirement. [***20] In
Grand County's view, the new language inserted by the
legislature requires a majority of "registered" voters in
the relevant areas even if those registered voters failed or
chose not to vote on the annexation proposal in question.
Under Grand County's statutory interpretation of section
17-2-8, the amended language of section 17-2-8(2) (b)
cannot be interpreted to set the same standard of approval for an annexation proposal as the "majority of
those voting" language in section 17-2-8(2)(a) which
was left unaffected by H.B. 49's amendment. If the two
phrases are interpreted as meaning the same thing, section 17-2-8(2) (a) becomes redundant with section 17-28(2)(b) and the change in the language was unnecessary.
In other words, according to Grand County, the legislature's decision to change the language was purposeful
and the change would not have been made unless some
different meaning and standard was in fact intended.
[*P27] The voting requirement associated with
county annexation is constitutionally mandated and defined. See Utah Const, art. XI, § 3. The legislature has
the authority to set the conditions of annexation by general law, but it does not have the authority [***21] to
establish or modify the voting requirement set forth in
the plain language of article XI, section 3. Because the
voting requirement is constitutionally intended and described, and because the language of the statute and the
constitution are identical, we interpret the constitutional
language and impute that meaning to the same language
used by the legislature in the statute. See Odd Fellows'
Bldg. Ass'n v. Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 114, 177 P. 214, 215
(1918); see also People ex rel. Baird v. Tilton, 37 Cal.
614, 622 (1869) ("The same construction should be
given to the same language used in the same connection,
in reference to a similar subject matter, when used in a
statute, as when used in the Constitution."); People ex
rel. Akin v. The Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 III.
236, 66 N.E. 349, 355 (III. 1903) ("When [a] statute is
couched in the same language as the Constitution, the
language of the statute will receive the same construction
as that of the Constitution . . . ."). In the case at hand, the
legislature's use of the exact language of the constitution
suggests that it intended the language of section 17-28(2)(b) and [***22] section 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A)-(B) to
have the same meaning and effect as the language of the
constitution. See State v. Woodcock, 168 Vt. 588, 719
A.2d 32, 32 (Vt. 1998). As a result, we need not address
Grand County's arguments based on the interpretation of
the statute or the legislature's intent in amending the language of the statute but rather focus our analysis on
[**1156] the meaning and interpretation of the constitutional provision.
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[*P28] As previously recited, article XI, section 3
prohibits the territory of one county from being annexed
by another county "unless a majority of the voters living
in such territory, as well as of the county to which it is to
be annexed, shall vote therefor." Utah Const, art. XI, § 3.
[*P29] "In interpreting the state constitution, we
look primarily to the language of the constitution itself. .
. ." State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1997).
Therefore, our starting point in interpreting a constitutional provision is the textual language itself. See State
v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, P 20, 44 PJd 756; Utah Sch. Bds.
Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ, 2001 UT 2, PI3, 17 PJd
1125; [***23] In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge
(Young), 1999 UT 6, P62, 976 P.2d 581 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). "We need not inquire beyond the plain
meaning of the [constitutional provision] unless we find
it ambiguous." Casey, 2002 UT29 at P20.
[*P30] The language at issue here is clear and unambiguous. "Voter" is defined as a "person who engages
in the act of voting." Black's Law Dictionary 1571 (7th
ed. 1999). Under this definition, article XI, section 3
requires a majority of persons who engage in the act of
voting who live in the territory to be annexed, as well as
those who live in the county to which that territory is to
be annexed, to vote in favor of an annexation proposal in
order for it to be approved. In other words, the group of
voters of which a majority is required consists merely of
those who exercise the right to vote on the annexation
proposal in question at the election in which the annexation proposal is offered for a vote. The number of votes
cast at the ballot box itself is the basis for determining a
majority, as opposed to the number of those possessing
the qualifications to vote or those registered to vote in
the annexing [***24] county or area to be annexed but
who do not actually vote. Those citizens who fail or
choose not to vote are presumed to assent to and acquiesce in the expressed will of the majority. This interpretation of the meaning and effect of the phrase "majority
of voters" is consistent with the well-settled, general rule
of American election law concerning the method of
computing a majority and with the long-standing interpretations of similar constitutional language by the highest courts of our kindred states.2
2 Citizens' Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Perry County,
156 US. 692, 712, 39 L. Ed. 585, 15 S. Ct 547
(1895) ("It is well settled by the decisions of this
court where a majority of those voting at an election . . . vote in favor of [a proposition] for the
purpose of registration [or certification] it will be
presumed that such majority so voting is a majority of all the legal voters living in the municipality at the time of the election . . . ."); County of
Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360, 369, 24 L. Ed 416

(1877) ("All qualified voters who absent themselves from an election duly called are presumed
to assent to the expressed will of the majority of
those voting, unless the law providing for the
election otherwise declares."); Glover v. Hot
Springs Kennel Club, Inc., 230 Ark. 544, 323
S.W.2d 902, 905 n.4, 907 (Ark. 1959) (interpreting constitutional and statutory language of "'majority of the voters of the county'" and "'majority
of the qualified electors of such county"' as meaning "a majority of those voting on the proposition" (citations omitted)); Vance v. Austell, 45
Ark. 400, 406-07 (1885) (endorsing and applying
reasoning of County of Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S.
360, 24 L. Ed 416); People ex rel Mitchell v.
Warfield, 20 III. 159, 164-65 (1858) (interpreting
Illinois constitution's language requiring majority
of voters of county to approve relocation of
county seat as meaning majority of "voters of the
county . . . who . . . vote at the election" and as
excluding "other voters of the county who were
detained from the election by absence or sickness, or [who] voluntarily absented themselves
from the polls"); In re Todd, 208 Ind. 168, 193
N.E. 865, 872-77 (Ind. 1935) (interpreting "voter"
and "elector" in Indiana constitution and holding
that group of voters of which majority is required
consists of those who exercise right to vote);
Walker v. Oswald, 68 Md 146, 11 A. 711, 713
(Md. 1887) ("It has been settled, both in England
and in this country, by an almost, if not quite, unbroken current of judicial decisions from the time
of Lord MANSFIELD to the present day, that
when an election is held at which a subject-matter
is to be determined by a majority of the voters entitled to cast ballots thereat, those absenting
themselves, and those who, being present, abstain
from voting, are considered as acquiescing in the
result declared by a majority of those actually
voting, even though, in point of fact, but a minority of those entitled to vote really do vote."); Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107, 116, 10 Gilf. 81-17
(1865) (interpreting Minnesota constitutional
provision requiring that laws changing established county lines be approved by majority of
electors of county to be affected and rejecting as
manifestly inconvenient and absurd position that
provision requires absolute majority of those
qualified to vote in county at time of election);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. County Ct., 33
Tenn. 637, 691-93 (1854) (holding that when approval of proposition is referred "to the decision
of a majority of the 'voters of a county,' [that
phrase] cannot be understood [to] mean anything
more than those who see fit to exercise the privi-

Pa2;e 7
2002 UT 57, *; 52 P.3d 1148, **;
450 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; 2002 Utah LEXIS 84, ***
lege [of voting on the proposition]"); 26 Am. Jur.
2d Elections § 406 (1996) ("In the absence of a
statutory provision to the contrary, voters not attending the election or not voting on the matter
submitted are presumed to assent to the expressed
will of those attending and voting and are not to
be taken into consideration in determining the result."); George W. McCrary, A Treatise on the
American Law of Elections in McCrary on Elections § 208 (4th ed. 1897) ("Where a statute [or
constitutional provision] requires a question to be
decided . . . by the votes of'a majority of the voters of a county,' this does not require that a majority of all persons in the county entitled to vote
shall actually vote affirmatively, but only that the
result shall be decided by the majority of the
votes c a s t . . . . The 'voters of the county' referred
to by all such statutes [or constitutional provisions] are necessarily the voters who vote at the
election, since the result in each case must be determined by a count of the ballots cast and not by
an inquiry as to the number not cast.").
[***25] [**1157] [*P31] Grand County's interpretation of the constitutional language would essentially
read the word "registered" into article XI, section 3 of the
constitution, and consequently, require that the number
of those voting in favor of the annexation proposal be a
majority of those registered to vote in the annexing
county and the area to be annexed instead of a majority
of those voters from the relevant areas who actually
voted on the annexation proposition during the election.
This would effectively allow those registered voters in
the two areas who did not actually vote to be counted as
votes against the annexation proposal. Such a method of
computing whether a majority of voters have approved a
proposition or have elected a candidate would be contrary to the plain meaning of the constitutional provision
and the long-established general rule. 3
3
It is worth noting that the general rule as
stated herein for computing a majority of voters
in an election can be modified by legislative enactment to require a greater majority. The legislature may require a two-thirds majority of voters
or a majority of "registered" voters; however, it

may do so only where granted the authority by
the constitution and then only through explicit
and clear language. As previously discussed, article XI, section 3 does not give the legislature authority to modify the voting requirement or approval standard set forth in the constitutional provision. In any event, it appears that the legislature
was not attempting to modify or increase the majority required for approval of a section 17-2-6(2)
annexation proposal, but rather, merely attempting to implement the stated voting requirement
and standard as it appears in article XI, section 3
by using the constitution's exact language.
[***26] [*P32] Therefore, the trial court correctly
concluded that only a majority of those voting on the
annexation proposal in Emery County and the Green
River portion of Grand County needed to vote in favor of
the annexation proposal for it to be approved. However,
the trial court erred in not certifying the results of the
election in accordance with this standard and its determination that the required electoral approval had been
achieved.
CONCLUSION
[*P33] For the foregoing reasons, the trial court
erred in declaring that section 17-2-6(2) of the Utah
Code is unconstitutional because it violates the "general
law" provision of article XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the trial court's grant of declaratory
judgment to Grand County is reversed. Furthermore, the
trial court also erred when it refused to certify the annexation proposal election results consistent with its
finding that the annexation proposal had received the
approval of the required majority of voters in Emery
County and the Green River portion of Grand County.
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion and the trial court's previous finding
that the annexation [***27] proposal received the required electoral approval.
[*P34] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Howe, and Justice Wilkins concur in
Justice Russon's opinion.
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K. J. SCHARF, dba Western Leasing, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BMG CORPORATION, Vernon R. Erickson, Michael R. Erickson, and Bruce V. Erickson, Defendants and Appellants
No. 18963
Supreme Court of Utah
700 P.2d 1068; 1985 Utah LEXIS 836; 40 UCC Rep, Serv. (Callaghan) 1932

April 16,1985, Filed
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed a
judgment from the trial court (Utah). The trial court
granted a deficiency judgment against defendant after
plaintiff sold equipment that plaintiff had leased to defendant.
OVERVIEW: Defendant leased two pieces of equipment from plaintiff. The equipment consisted of a hydraulic shear and a lathe. When defendant defaulted on
the leases, plaintiff repossessed and sold the equipment.
Plaintiff thereinafter sought and was granted a deficiency
judgment on the difference between the balance owing
on the leases and the amount realized from the sale of the
equipment. Defendant appealed the grant of a deficiency
judgment. Defendant claimed plaintiffs sale of the
equipment was not commercially reasonable, and plaintiffs notice of sale did not constitute reasonable notification under Utah law. The court disagreed. In affirming
the deficiency judgment, the court held that plaintiff
made reasonable and diligent efforts to sell the equipment for a commercially reasonable price. The court also
found that plaintiffs notice to defendant regarding the
sale was sufficient.
OUTCOME: The court found plaintiffs efforts commercially reasonable and affirmed the award of the deficiency judgment.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Creditor Misbehavior > General
Overview
Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Disposition of Collateral
Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Notice
ofSale
[HN1] See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1953, 1980
ed.).

Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Notice
of Sale
Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Public
Sale
Contracts Law > Secured Transactions > Default >
Foreclosure & Repossession > Notice Requirements
[HN2] See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1953, 1980
ed.).

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
Clearly Erroneous Review
[HN3] To mount a successful attack on the trial court's
findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favor-
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able to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De
Novo Review
[HN4] The standard of review for conclusions of law
differs from that applicable to factual findings; an appellate court accords conclusions of law no particular deference, but reviews them for correctness.

Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Creditor Misbehavior > Commercially Reasonable Conduct
Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Public
Sale
[HN5] Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) requires that a
disposition of collateral must be commercially reasonable in every aspect.

Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Public
Sale
[HN6] See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507(2).

Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Notice
of Sale
Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Article 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Public
Sale
[HN7] Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) provides that
reasonable notice should specify whether the sale is to be
public or private. Further, if a sale is private, reasonable
notice must specify the time after which the sale is to be
made. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1953, 1980 ed.).

[*1069] Defendant Vernon R. Erickson personally
guaranteed leases on two pieces of repossessed equipment. He appeals from a deficiency judgment entered
against him after the lessor, Kathy Scharf, sold the
equipment. Erickson claims that Scharf s sale of the
equipment was not "commercially reasonable" and that
the notice of sale actually given did not constitute "reasonable notification," all as required by section 70A-9504(3) of the Code. U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-9-504(3)
(1980 ed.). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In the spring of 1979, Scharf, doing business as
Western Leasing, leased a $33,000 Summit hydraulic
shear and an $18,000 Victor lathe to BMG Corporation.
Michael R. and Bruce V. Erickson, the principals of
BMG, and their father, Vernon R. Erickson, executed
personal guarantees of faithful performance under the
lease agreements. In April of 1980, BMG [**2] Corporation defaulted on the payments due under both leases,
and on September 5, 1980, Scharf repossessed the
equipment with the Ericksons' consent. On October 1,
1980, Scharf sold the lathe for $6,000, and approximately a week later, she sold the shear for $19,000. She
then brought an action pursuant to section 70A-9-504(2)
of the Code, seeking to recover the difference between
the balance owing on the leases and the amount realized
from the sale of the equipment.
At the October 8, 1982, trial, counsel for Vernon
Erickson, the only defendant remaining in the action,
argued that the sale of the equipment failed to comply
with section 70A-9-504(3) of the Code, which gives a
secured party the right to dispose of collateral after default. In pertinent part, that section provides: [HN1]
"Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels
and at any time and place and on any terms but every
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable."
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-9-504(3) (1980 ed.). The same
section also describes the notice that must be given to the
debtor when collateral is disposed of:
[HN2] Unless collateral is perishable
[**3] or threatens to decline speedily in
value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public
sale or reasonable notification of the time
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be
sent by the secured party to the debtor.

COUNSEL: [**1] Roy G. Haslam, Salt Lake City, for
Petitioner.
Bryce E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Zimmerman, Justice, wrote the opinion. We
concur: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe,
Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice. Stewart, Justice,
concurs in the result.
OPINION BY: ZIMMERMAN
Id
OPINION

Erickson asserted at trial that the method, manner,
and timing of the sale all failed to meet section 70A-9-
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504(3 )'s standard of commercial reasonableness. He also
asserted that the notice was technically deficient because
it failed to state whether the sale would be public or private and did not specify a date, time, and location for the
sale. These inadequacies, according to Erickson, prejudiced him by denying him the opportunity to arrange a
sale on more favorable terms.

that, as a matter of law, the sale was commercially reasonable. [HN5] Section 70A-9-504(3) of the Code requires that a disposition of collateral must be commercially reasonable in every [**6] aspect. Erickson claims
that section 70A-9-507(2) describes what is necessary to
satisfy the standard of commercial reasonableness. It
provides:

After hearing the testimony, the trial court entered
detailed factual findings supporting its conclusions that
the sale was private, that it was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner, that the notification met the
statutory standard of reasonableness, that the prices received for the equipment reflected its reasonable market
value, and that any deficiencies in notice [**4] were not
prejudicial to defendant. The trial court entered a deficiency judgment for Scharf in the amount of $54,310.21
and awarded her $3,500 in attorney fees.

[HN6] The fact that a better price could
have been obtained by a sale at a different
time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself
sufficient to establish that the sale was not
made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either [1] sells the
collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or [2] if he sells
at the price current in such market at the
time of his sale or [3] if he has otherwise
sold in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the
type of property sold he has sold in a
commercially reasonable manner.

On appeal, Erickson again argues that the sale was
not commercially reasonable and that the notice was inadequate under the statute, attacking both the trial court's
factual findings and its legal conclusions. The challenges to the factual findings can be disposed of readily.
Erickson makes numerous arguments based on the facts
as he presented them to the trial [*1070] court, rather
than on the facts as found by that court. However, at no
point does he even discuss the detailed findings entered
by the lower court that contradict his factual assertions.
With respect to these matters, we take as our starting
point the trial court's findings and not Erickson's recitation of the facts. [HN3] To mount a successful attack on
the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings. See, e.g., Charlton v.
Hackett, 11 [**5] Utah 2d 389, 390, 360 P.2d 176
(1961); Hutcheson v. Gleave, Utah, 632 P. 2d 815
(1981); Kohler v. Garden City; Utah, 639 P.2d 162, 165
(1981); Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc.,
Utah, 657 P.2d 743 (1982). Erickson has not begun to
carry that heavy burden. Nowhere does he marshal the
evidence supporting his version of the facts, much less
the evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Under
these circumstances, we decline to further consider
Erickson's attack on the factual findings.
We next consider Erickson's claim that the trial court
erred in its conclusions of law. [HN4] The standard of
review differs from that applicable to factual findings;
we accord conclusions of law no particular deference,
but review them for correctness. See, e.g., Automotive
Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts,
Inc., Utah, 596 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1979); Betenson v. Call
Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., Utah, 645 P.2d 684, 686
(1982). Erickson first attacks the trial court's conclusion

U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-9-507(2) (1980 ed.). Erickson argues that for a sale to have been commercially reasonable, it must have been handled in one of the three modes
set out in the above-quoted section. He then asserts that
under the facts as he perceives them, none of these three
standards have been met. His argument is without merit.
Even if we were to assume that the facts as found by the
lower court do not [**7] show that the collateral was
disposed of in one of the three specified modes, Erickson's argument fails because the three types of disposition set out in section 70A-9-507(2) are examples only;
they are not the exclusive method of authorized disposition.
This provision of our Code is identical to its Uniform Commercial Code counterpart. In interpreting provisions of our Code, we often turn to the official comments of the Uniform Commercial Code for guidance.
The official comment to the section at issue here disposes of Erickson's argument. "None of the specific
methods of disposition set forth in subsection (2) is to be
regarded as either required or exclusive, provided only
that the disposition made or about to be made by the secured party is commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-507,
comment 2 (1981).
Since the statutory standard of commercial reasonableness cannot be measured with a bright-line test,
whether any particular sale is commercially reasonable is
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. That determination depends on whether the circumstances of the sale
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and the manner and business context in which it occurred
[*1071] support a conclusion that the sale was [**8]
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. In this
case, the facts found by the trial court provide ample
support for the legal conclusion that the sale was commercially reasonable.

sale, or arrange for interested parties to bid, and to otherwise assure that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner." FMA Financial Corp. v. ProPrinters, Utah, 590 P.2d 803, 807 (1979). The notice
requirement gives the debtor the opportunity to actively
protect his interests.

Erickson also contends that the notice of sale provided by Scharf did not comport with the statutory requirements and, therefore, that no deficiency judgment
can be had under the provisions of section 70A-9-504(2)
of the Code. He relies on several technical deficiencies
in the letter that operated as a notice of the sale. The
September 8, 1980, letter informed him that the equipment had been repossessed and demanded that he pay the
total outstanding indebtedness. It also stated that "the
equipment . . . . will be sold on September 30, 1980,
unless the amounts due under the lease agreement have
been paid." (Emphasis added.) Erickson points out two
problems with the letter. First, it did not specify whether
the sale was to be public or private. Second, the equipment was not sold on September 30th as announced in
the letter; one item was sold on October 1st, and the
other was sold on October 9th.

In the present case, the purpose of the notice requirement was adequately satisfied, and Erickson has
shown no prejudice from the technical deficiencies.
Throughout the period from April of 1980, when the
lessees first defaulted, through October, when the sales
occurred, Erickson and the other guarantors did nothing
to secure purchasers for the equipment or otherwise protect their interests. The findings of the trial court established that Erickson at no time showed any interest in the
disposition of the collateral. Scharf took all the initiative
in disposing of the equipment. [**11] She diligently
sought out potential buyers and eventually arranged to
sell the shear to Tan-Dem Machinery for the highest bid
received-$ 17,000. On September 30th, well after Erickson had received his written notice, Scharf once again
took the initiative, this time telephoning Erickson and
informing him of the imminent sale. Erickson approved
the bid. The sale to Tan-Dem fell through. About a week
later, on October 9th, Scharf sold the shear to another
party for $19,000, $2,000 more than Tan-Dem had offered.

The letter was technically deficient in both respects.
[HN7] Section 70A-9-504(3) of the Code provides [**9]
that reasonable notice should specify whether the sale is
to be public or private. Further, if a sale is private, as
this one was found to be, reasonable notice must specify
"the time after which" the sale is to be made. U.C.A.,
1953, § 70A-9-504(3) (1980 ed.) (emphasis added).
Scharf s notice stated the day on which the sale was to
occur, while the actual sales occurred one day and nine
days, respectively, after the date fixed in the notice.
In addition to relying on the technical deficiencies in
the notice to protect him from the deficiency judgment,
Erickson claims that he was prejudiced because he could
have used the several days that elapsed between the date
the sale was to have occurred and the date it actually
occurred to find a buyer who would pay a higher price.
His notice contention is without merit. In Pioneer
Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee, Utah, 649 P.2d 28
(1982), the debtor received notice that her repossessed
truck would be auctioned off at 11:00 a.m. on a specified
day; instead, the truck was sold at 10:00 a.m. Because
the debtor did not show up at 11:00 a.m., we held that
she was not prejudiced by the error. Id. at 29. By looking beyond [**10] the technicalities of the notice requirement to its essential purpose, Pioneer Dodge made
it plain that the formal elements of the notice requirement must not be followed to the frustration of its purpose. "The purpose of the notice requirement is for the
protection of the debtor, by permitting him to bid at the

[*1072] Because Erickson made no effort at any
time to procure a buyer for either piece of equipment and
had approved the sale of the shear on the day set forth in
the notice for less than was eventually obtained, we cannot find that he was prejudiced by either the technical
defects in the notice or the slight delay in the sale. In
fact, since he acquiesced to the lower bid, the delay actually worked to his advantage by lessening the deficiency
by $2,000. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
the notice was reasonable.
The deficiency judgment entered by the lower court
against Erickson is therefore affirmed. In light of the
facts that the leases involved in [**12] this matter provided for an award of attorney fees to Scharf in any action necessary to enforce the leases and the trial court
awarded them to her in connection with the proceedings
below, we remand the case for determination of reasonable fees in connection with this appeal as well. Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates,
Utah, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (1980).
WE CONCUR: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice.
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH R. FOX and LINDA FOX,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF
NOAH CONVERSE AND SCOTT
STARR WITH ACCOMPANYING
EXHIBITS

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.

Civil No. 040401488
Division 5
Judge Fred D. Howard

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on Tuesday, November 14, 2006,
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court Judge,
presiding. The Plaintiffs were present, pro se. The Defendant was present and represented by its
counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC, and David B. Thomas,
Office of General Counsel, Brigham Young University.

Upon oral motion, the Plaintiffs objected to the testimony of Noah Converse and Scott Starr
and to the Utah EMS Incident Report and the Brigham Young University Police Department EMS
Incident Table with Accompanying Report insofar as the testimony or the exhibits included a written
or oral statement taken by Mr. Converse or Mr. Starr in their capacity as volunteer Brigham Young
University Emergency Medical Service personnel attending to the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox on April
20, 2004, on the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center (hereinafter "the
stairs") to the effect that:
1. There was no cartilage in Linda A. Fox's right knee due to arthritis;
2. Linda A. Fox's right knee went out on her as she was going down the stairs;
3. Linda A. Fox fell down only one stair;
4. Over and over again the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox said words to the effect that her
knee just went out on her as she was going down the stairs and that she did not hold Brigham Young
University responsible; and
5. Over and over again the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox said that the stairs are too narrow
and have always been dangerous.

(See, generally, the Affidavit of Noah Converse with

accompanying Exhibits dated February 15, 2005.)
The Plaintiffs Foxes' objection was based upon Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-33, a statutory
rule of evidence which, under certain conditions, if enforceable, would make statements of an injured
person inadmissible as evidence in a civil proceeding. The Plaintiffs allege that the conditions set
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forth in Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-33 apply. For the purpose of this Ruling, and for that purpose
only, the Court assumes that the Plaintiffs are accurate in that regard.
The Court denies the objection. In so doing, the Court relies, in part, upon the following:
1. Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, which states, in part:
"The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature
may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court
upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. ..."
2. On September 10, 1985, the Utah Supreme Court filed a pro curium order in the
matter of In Re: Rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of this state. In pertinent
part, that order states:
"Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as
amended, the Court adopts all existing statutory Rules of Procedure and Evidence not
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of procedure and evidence heretofore
adopted by this Court. Effective as of July 1, 1985."
3. The Preliminary Note to the Utah Court Rules states, in part:
"Any existing statutes inconsistent with these rules ... will be impliedly repealed."
4. The testimony and exhibits objected to by the Plaintiffs are admissions by a party
opponent pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(2).
///
///
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5. The testimony and exhibits objected to by the Plaintiffs are, pursuant to Rule
803(4), an exception to the hearsay rule as a statement for the purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment.
DATED this

/ $ L _ day of.
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BY THE COURT:

JUD^SE FRED D./HOW
Fourth District Court

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'

OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF NOAH CONVERSE AND SCOTT STARR WITH ACCOMPANYING
EXHIBITS was delivered, this

21 ST day of November, 2006, addressed as follows and in the manner

indicated:
Linda A. Fox
1149 East 1630 South
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

A.

- via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid
- via Facsimile (
)
- via Hand Delivery

Joseph R. Fox
1149 East 1630 South
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

%

- via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid
- via Facsimile (
)
- via Hand Delivery
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE

TO:

LINDA A. FOX and JOSEPH R. FOX:
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS 5 OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF NOAH CONVERSE
AND SCOTT STARR W I T H ACCOMPANYING EXHIBITS to the Honorable Fred D. Howard for his

and foregoing

signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three days for mailing,
unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
DATED this
day of November, 2006.
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON

t^UU^
THOMAS W. SEILER
Attorney for Defendant

G \SEILER\BYU FoxVOrder Denying Plaintiffs* Objections wpd
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH R. FOX and LINDA FOX,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 040401488
vs.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah
corporation,

Division 5
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on Tuesday, November 14, 2006,
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court Judge,
presiding. The Plaintiffs were present in person and appeared pro se. The Defendant was present
and represented by its counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC,
and David B. Thomas, Office of General Counsel, Brigham Young University. Certain evidence

was proffered. The parties advised the Court fully in the premises and does, hereby, enter the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Plaintiffs allege that the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox was injured on April 20, 2004, when
she fell on the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center (hereinafter "the
stairs") as she descended the stairs.
2. The Plaintiffs stipulated they would try this case without any expert witness of any kind
on any subject, including but not limited to:
a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and
b. Mrs. Fox's medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 20, 2004.
3. In the Spring of 2003, Linda A. Fox had been told by Dr. Richard Jackson that Linda
would require a future knee replacement. (Linda Fox deposition, p.16: 11-14.)
4. In the Spring of 2003, Dr. Richard Jackson had x-rayed Linda Fox's right knee and
reported to her that her right knee was missing cartilage and diagnosed Linda Fox with an arthritic
knee. (Linda Fox deposition, p. 17:6; Affidavit of Linda Fox, April 7,2005, f 2 (hereinafter referred
to as "Fox Affidavit.")
5. On April 20, 2004, Linda Fox told the Emergency Medical Service volunteers who
attended to her that her knee went out as she was going down the stairs. (Affidavit of Noah
Converse, f l l , b.)

2

6. Prior to the April 20, 200r, fall, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox had some cartilage missing in
her right knee due to osteoarthritis.

(Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Request for

Admissions and Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 11.)
7. Before her fall on April 20, 2004, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox reported having pain on the
lateral side of her right knee. (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Request for Admissions and
Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 13.)
8. Prior to Linda Fox's fall on April 20,2004, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox was diagnosed with
having some joint space narrowing in her right knee. (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First
Request for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 14.)
9. The Plaintiffs had, prior to Trial, determined not to call any expert witnesses and rested
upon their theory that all elements of the Plaintiffs' claims could be provided for by lay testimony.
10. The only facts concerning causation or the mechanism of injury in the instant case that
may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses by a lay witness are that Linda Fox was
descending the stairs and she fell. No lay witness can, by the ordinary use of the lay witness's
senses, testify that whether the fall of Linda Fox was or was not caused by the symptomatic medical
condition of Linda Fox's knee.
11. Linda Fox fell without the physical intervention of any actor.
12. The Plaintiffs' claims were all based solely on alleged negligence of the Defendant.
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13. No person inspected the stairs after Linda Fox's alleged fall to determine the condition
of the stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell.
14. Plaintiffs do not know which stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs had no witness who could testify as to the condition of the stairs
and had no witness who could testify as to whether or not the stairs were dangerous, the Plaintiffs
agreed that there would be no expert testimony regarding the condition of the stairs.
2. The Plaintiffs' determination that they would call no expert witnesses on any subject,
including but not limited to:
a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and
b. Linda Fox's medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 29,2004;
precluded evidence that Linda Fox's fall was not caused by her symptomatic, pre-existing,
osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee which had loss of cartilage.
3. The Plaintiffs had not pled, with specificity, any portion of the Provo City Building Code
in connection with this case nor had they named any person who could testify as to whether or not
the stairs conformed to the Provo City Building Code. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 9(i), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Court could not find that the stairs failed to conform to safety requirements
of the building code.
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4. In the absence of any expert witness who could opine as to whether Mrs. Fox fell because
of her symptomatic, pre-existing condition as described above or for some other cause, the Plaintiffs
cannot sustain their burden of proof as to causation.
5. In the absence of any healthcare provider who could opine as to the reasonable necessity
of any healthcare received by the Plaintiff Linda Fox, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of
proof as to damages.
6. Joseph R. Fox's claim is for loss of consortium. Because Linda A. Fox cannot sustain her
burden of proof as to causation nor as to damages, the Plaintiff Joseph R. Fox's claim for loss of
consortium fails.

DATED this

/ ^

day of

; 2006.
BY THE COURT:

;^%£J1?*0

JUD0E FRED ty. HOW.
Fourth District Court
Approved as to form:
'
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LINDA A. FOX - Plaintiff

JOSEPH R. FOX - Plaintiff

5

n n 1-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW was delivered, this 21 g\* day of November, 2006, addressed as follows and in the manner
indicated:
Linda A. Fox
1149 East 1630 South
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

-X

Joseph R. Fox
1149 East 1630 South
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

_x_ - via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid

- via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid
- via Facsimile (
)
- via Hand Delivery

- via Facsimile (
)
- via Hand Delivery

TThcrYttJQJ
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE

TO:

LINDA A. FOX and JOSEPH R. FOX:

Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above
and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Honorable Fred D. Howard for his
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three days for mailing,
unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
DATED this £/~

day of November, 2006.
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON

1

•&CL
IOMAS W. SEILER
Attornev for Defendant

G \SEILER\BYU - Fox\FOF & COL wpd
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
\z(l*{o£

m

Dap„ty

Thomas W.Seiler, #2910
Lori D. Huntington #6252
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC
Attorneys for Defendant
80 North 100 East
PO Box 1266
Provo, Utah 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH R. FOX and LINDA FOX,

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiffs,
!

Civil No. 040401488

vs.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah
corporation,

Division 5
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant.

The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does,
hereby, grant the Defendant's oral motion to dismiss and dismisses the Plaintiffs' Complaint, the
causes of action therein, and all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant, with prejudice and
upon the merits.
DATED this

/%

day of

] ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 0 6 .

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH
was delivered, this ?.|«sV day of November, 2006, addressed as follows and in the
manner indicated:
PREJUDICE

Linda A. Fox
1149 East 1630 South
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

X

- via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid
- via Facsimile (
)
- via Hand Delivery

Joseph R. Fox
1149 East 1630 South
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

-X.

- via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid
- via Facsimile (
)
- via Hand Delivery

^^j^^mx^
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE

TO:

LINDA A. FOX and JOSEPH R. FOX:

Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above
and foregoing Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice to the Honorable Fred D. Howard for his
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three days for mailing,
unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
DATED this ^ / - d a y of November, 2006.
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON

THOMAS W. SEILER
Attorney for Defendant

G \SEILER\BYU - FoxYJudgment of Dismissal with Prejudice wpd
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

\\&6WtL<o*ll*i
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL

JOSEPH R. FOX, et al,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 7040401488 PI

vs.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

Bench Trial
Electronically Recorded on
November 14, 2006
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE FRED D. HOWARD
Fourth District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Joseph R. Fox
(Appearing pro se)

For the Defendant:

Thomas W. Seiler
80 N. 100 E.
Provo, UT 84606
Telephone: (801)375-1920

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT
1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-2927

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2 I

(Electronically recorded on November 14, 2006)

3

THE COURT:

Please be seated.

Good morning.

4

MR. FOX:

Good morning, your Honor.

5

MS. FOX:

Good morning.

6

THE COURT:

Let me call the case and have'you make

7

your appearance.

8

Mr. Joseph R. Fox and Linda A. Fox, plaintiffs, versus Brigham

9

Young University, defendant.

10

This is case No. 040401488, the matter of

Mrs. Fox are here.

I'll note for the record Mr. and

Good morning.

11

MS. FOX:

Good morning.

12

MR. FOX:

Good morning.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SEILER:

Mr. Seller?
Tom Seiler for BYU, your Honor.

I have

15

with me David Thomas from General Counsel's Office at BYU who

16

is co-counsel, and we also have Glen Johns from the Risk

17

Management Office.

18

THE COURT:

Good morning.

Thank you for your appearance

19

and your preparations today.

20

this case.

21

communication yesterday afternoon.

22

available.

23

important one that came to mind about the question of recusing.

This is the time set for trial in

We did -- I wish to make a record regarding our
Thank you for being

I'm sorry for that late discussion, but it was an

24

Are you prepared to address that question at this time?

25

MR. SEILER:

I am, your Honor.
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MR. FOX:

2

MR. SEILER

3

what h a p p e n e d

Your Honor, would you like me to restate

y e s t e rday, if that's -I have a record sc I dc n't think that's

THE COURT:

4
5

Yes .

necessary.

6

MR. SEILER :

7

THE COURT:

8

is .

MR. FOX:

Fox' s position

I think we'd prefer to go forward wi th it,

your Honor, .In view of our discussions.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. FOX:

13

THE COURT:

14

I just want to know what Mr

I need to make a record on that pc sition.

9
10

Oh.

You're not asking that I recuse myself?
That's correct.
Very good.

Thank you.

And that's true for

Thank you.

All right.

b o t h of you, Ms . Li nda as well?

15

MS.

FOX:

16

THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

Before

17

we p r o c e e d ,

18

the C o u r t t h a t I w i s h t o address that I thin k is of lar ge

19

importance

20

h a v e a large impact on this case, so I assume we should address

21

this

22

time

i n r e v i e w of t h e case

is t h i s m o t i o n in limine reg a r d m g causation that may

I had thought we might have you argue that motion at this

23

MR. SEILER :

24

THE COURT:

25

s o m e t h i n g that is concerning to

you, Mr.

Thank you, your Honor.
That may shape the case .

Sc> I'll hear from

Seiler and then I assume I wou Id hear from Mr. Fox.
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MR. FOX:

Yes.

2 I

MR. SEILER:

Your Honor, we have in this case an

3

allegation that Mrs. Fox as she was descending the stairs at

4

Brigham Young University at Harmon Conference Center, which is

5

sort of at the north end of campus, that she -- her allegation is

6

that she fell on those stairs.

7

stairs.

8

been no expert wit -- or expert disclosure in this matter, and I

9

would cite the Court most easily to the plaintiff's response to

We believe she did fall on those

However, the question is why did she fall.

There has

10

our defendant's motion in limine in their fact paragraph,

11

paragraph 1 where it says, "Neither the plaintiffs nor the

12

defendant have identified expert witnesses as required by Utah

13

Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) on the case management order

14

herein."

So if -- I don't know if the Court has found that.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SEILER:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SEILER:

Yes.
In fact, I have a courtesy copy.
I'm okay.

I've got it.

So we know that there is no expert

19

disclosure and that it should have been -- it was required by

20

both the rule and by the case management order.

21
22

Did the Court have a chance to read that motion
yesterday -- that memo?

23

THE COURT:

I have.

24

MR. SEILER:

Okay.

25

mechanism of injury?

In this instance what is the

There is many things that we do not know
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and that really are not within the canon of the average person.

2

We don't know the rate at which metal -- that the metal screws

3

deteriorate.

4

different opposing claims.

One is Mrs. Fox in one affidavit says

5

that she tripped and fell.

Another one says that she slipped and

6

fell, that her foot went out from underneath her.

7

Now the claim is -- there's two claims, two

In any event, the claim must be that there was something

8

wrong with the -- something on the tread.

9

something wrong with something on the tread in order for their

10

There has to be

claim to have any validity at all.

11

In this instance we have no -- we don't have any proof

12

of that, and here's why we don't.

13

location was.

14

what caused -- you know, what was wrong with the stair.

15

know that.

16

She says in her affidavits that she doesn't know the exact

17

location.

18

looked at it.

19

nobody that's going to sit on the witness stand and say, "I saw

20

that stair tread," or "I saw that metal nosing and it was

21

defective in these ways, 1, 2, 3," whatever.

22

anybody that will say that.

23

We don't know what the

We asked in affidavit form and in deposition form
We don't

We don't know where the stair was that she fell upon.

We have no one who inspected the stair tread.

No one

No one knows whether it was -- no one -- there's

There just isn't

We don't have any person who will say, "This is the rate

24

at which metal nosings deteriorate and the rate at which they

25

should be replaced."

That testimony is not before the Court.
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There is no witness thar will say that.

2

We have -- when I say we have no expert, we also have no

3

expert on how she was injured, that is whether she was injured

4

because her osteoarthritic knee gave way or because something

5

else made her fall.

6

closest you might have is you might say, "Well, what about the

7

medical doctors, what about what they had to say."

8
9

We don't have any testimony about that.

The

Those people are people identified according to the
plaintiff's responses to the request for production of documents.

10

They're identified in the initial disclosures, which are called

11

names of individuals likely to have discoverable evidence, Rule

12

26.

13

each of the --

14
15
16
17
18

That's what -- that's the pleading that's referred to.

THE COURT:

Well, is that test —

to be before the Court?
MR. SEILER:

In

is that record going

I mean you've --

It's part of —

I believe it's part of the

file, your Honor.
THE COURT:

And that's my question.

You made reference

19

to this -- I noted m

your motion, for example, page 8 you say,

20

"Doctor -- Linda Fox reported to the emergency room physician

21

Dr. Murdoch that her right knee suddenly gave out.

22

down to the ground," and then IHC preliminary, "She fell, her

23

knee came out from underneath her."

24

the medical records?

25

MR. SEILER:

She collapsed

Is that a citation, then, to

It will be a citation to —

and I believe
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that if the <doctors :ome -- and we didn't subpoena them.

2

plaintiff ma y have.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. SEILER:

The

If they come that's what they will say.
Okay.
But it's interesting, your Honor, and I can

5

give the Cou.rt a copy of the pleading just so that it's handy for

6

the Court.

I've got one for you, Mr. Fox, - ust so you don't have

7

to get up.

It says •--

THE COURT:

8
9
10
11

I guess the question I have is how does that

testimony become of .record for this motion?
MR. SEILER:

Oh, because it's admitted by the plaintiff,

Mrs. Fox, in her dep<Dsition that's attached to --

12

THE COURT:

It is?

13

MR. SEILER:

Yes.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SEILER:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SEILER:

18

She's admitted that -Yes.
-- those statements to the physician?
She admits that those statements appear in

the record --- in the medical record.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SEILER:

Not that she made those statements?
She disagrees somewhat with what the

21

statement says.

22

about to say, though, your Honor.

23

testimony about what caused her injury, and this is what they say ^

24

about those experts.

25

experts.''

That's actually not the poi.nt of what I was
You must have some medical

Again, they said, "We don't have any

This is what they say the doctors are going to

-8testify.

They're gc/ing to say testimony and documents concerning
The y' re not going to say causation.

medical services rerLdered

They don 't ever say that any of these doctors -- and there's a
list of them, most c f them on page 2 of
THE COURT:

Can I back up again?

MR. SEILER:
THE COURT:
the exhi bits

~

Yes , your Honor.
Have the - - I didn't read the disclosure on

Have they cited the medical records as exhibits

they intend to offer 9
MR. SEILER:
THE COURT:

Yes

•

It's expected these records would come in,

then?
MR. SEILER:
THE COURT:

Yes
I see.

MR. SEILER:
THE COURT:

But they —
And these statements are taken from those

! records?
MR. SEILER:
THE COURT:

Exa ctly.
I see.

MR. SEILER:

And those —

in fact, those exhibits --

those me dical records are part of the exhibits to their initial
disclosures as they produced th em at that point.

They also

produced them as part of the exhibits that they delivered to us
as part of this trial.
THE COURT:

Am I given to understand, then, that the

1

1

records include important information about treatment she

2

received for her injuries?

3

MR. SEILER:

4

THE COURT:

5

And that they also contained what would be

considered a history of the patient?

6

MR. SEILER:

7

THE COURT:

8

Yes.

Yes.
Or —

and she may dispute the statements

made, but those are statements recorded?
MR. SEILER:

9

Yes.

10

THE COURT:

Is that correct?

11

MR. SEILER:

That's correct.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SEILER:

14

injury

I see.
What they don't say is the cause of the

—

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SEILER:

I understand.
—

other than saying that her foot gave out

17

from under her -- her knee gave out, I believe, is the actual

18

term.

19

must have some causation testimony.

20

saying they don't know exactly where she fell.

21

testifying as to the condition, that they inspected the stair or

22

any group of those stairs as to what that condition is.

23

don't have --

24
25

So that's what they say about that.

THE COURT:

We think that you

You have the plaintiffs
You have no one

You

They don't have testimony of something that

would alert BYU as to the defect on the stair?
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MR. SEILER:

They do not.

The very closesz

you come is

2

there is some testimony that you could hear noise as you walked

3

up, but that' s it.

4

went on April 23rd -- this fall occurred on April 20 --

5
6

THE COURT:
it?

MR. SEILER:

Well, it's al so causat ion, your Honor.

there's not a defect in the stair that cause d the accident

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Well, that's more duty than causation, isn't

Well, ag ain, maybe it's both.

7
8

Afterwards there is test imony that Mr. Fox

If

—

Yeah, okay.

MR. SEILER:

—

how could there -- you know, how could

it be the cause of it?

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SEILER:

All right.
We know there 's a defect in the knee

14

because there 's plenty of testimony about or plenty of

15

documentation about that.

16

The very best in answer to the one question the Court

17

had, the very closest you have to any defect in the stairs is not

18

a defect as to the stair that Mrs. Fox fell on because we don't

19

know what stair that was.

20

the 23rd, some three days after her fall and saw some loose metal

21

treads.

22

no testimony to the effect that the metal treads he saw that were

23

loose were at the location she fell because he testifies in his

24

affidavit and in his deposition, I believe a lso, but at least in

25

his affidavit and the request for - - answers to request for

It is ra ther Mr. Fox saying he went on

So he may have seen some some other time, but there is

|
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1

production of documents,

2

She admits she doesn't know the location of her fall.

3

I dor/t know rhe location of her f all."

She says it was on —

this stair has three cascading

4

sets of stairs with two landings in between them.

There's a

5

group of stairs and then there's a landing, a group of stairs and

6

a landing.

7

in the middle of a group of stairs of the la -- and approximately

8

on the -- probably on the bottom of the three sets.

9

the most you have.

Mrs. Fox says that she believes it was approximately

You don't have anybody say,

vx

So that's

We" —

or you

10

don't have her saying, "I saw either before or after I fell on

11

that stair this defect."

It does not occur.

12

Now the second -- let's see if I can hit all that.

Oh.

13

The second part of that motion is as to damages themselves.

14

caused the damage?

15

slipped on the stairs in some way, and even assume that there was

16

some negligence -- which there's no evidence of, but if you got

17

that far -- nobody has been set forth as an expert to say that

18

the injuries she sustained was caused by tripping or falling.

19

Rather, the other reasonable explanation is she had

20

osteoarthritis of the knee, and the medical techs say one of the

21

things that happen is your bones break.

22

explanation is that her -- she stepped hard enough that her bone

23

broke.

24

is not within the common canon of a lay person.

25

no 702 evidence, not one shred.

What

If you assume for a moment that Mrs. Fox

Indeed, the more likely

But there's no testimony one way or the other, and that
We simply have

Without that how do you say what

-12caused this injury?

2

I mean it's not as though there was a car accident and

3

you have people say, "Oh, I saw car A run the stop light and hit

4

car B."

5

leg went out from underneath me," and that is the testimony

You have Mrs . Fox saying, "I went down the stairs and my

6 1 That's it.

There is no other causation.

Without the causation

7

and without some leg of the damages, there is no way to go

8

forward, actually.

9

be no la y testimony as to causation and no expert testimony as to

10

causation.

11
12

C,ertainly the Court ought to order that there

THE COURT:
question , then.

Well, this -- I mean I have another

This motion is couched as a motion in limine,

13 ' but it has seemingly a dispositive conclusion by your position.
14

MR. SEILER:

Well, if —

I don't know what's left.

If

15

you don' t have anyone who can say, "I observed the fall and this

16

is what caused the fa 11," whatever that was, or someone who says,

17

"I'm an expert and I went back and looked at the stairs and

18

looked - - or looked at the knee and this is what caused" --

19

THE COURT:

No, I mean my question is is that this is a

20 • motion in limine, but it has the effect of -21
22

MR. SEILER:
in terms of testimony

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SEILER:

25

Certainly, because I don't know what's left

have?

I see.

All right.

Is there other questions the Court might

-13No, I car/t think of anything.

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. SEILEF

3

THE COURT:

4

Mr. Fox?

Good morning.

5

MR. FOX:

Good morning, your Honor.

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you for your time a nd effort.

With respect to the

6

defendant's imotion in limine, as I understand it, the motion --

7

the purpose of the motion was simply to contro 1 the presentation

8

of evidence and not to argue the merits of the case, but that's

9

where the defendant chose to go.

10

We believe that we can present sufficient evidence to

11

show a prima facie case using lay testimony.

12

show that Mrs. Fox, as she descended the stairs in a reasonable

13

manner, that she st epped on a worn, loose metal nosing and her

14

foot slipped off th e edge of the stair and she fell in a twisting

15

sitting motion and broke her leg.

16
17

As far as causation is concerned, we believe that that's
causation, that

—

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. FOX:

20

THE COURT:

21

The evidence will

Could I ask you a couple of questions?
Sure.
I had to say -- I've read your opposition

and understood that to be your position.

22

MR. FOX:

23

THE COURT:

Very good.
I assume that you don't take -- my^under --

24

my question is, I concluded from your pleading that you take the

25

position -- you don 't dispute the idea that an expert might give
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testimon y on this, but you are here to present: tnat testimony

2

in the f orm of lay testimony.

3

not

—

4

MR. FOX:

5

THE COURT

6

MR. FOX:

7

THE COURT

8

You're not disputing that you do

That's correct.
-- designated an expert on the subject.
We have designated an expert.
But you're presenting -- you intend to

present evidence of causation by virtue of lay testimony?

9

MR. FOX:

10

THE COURT

11

MR. FOX:

12

THE COURT

That's correct.
Through lay testimony.
That's correct.
The other question I had is I assume that

13

there is not a dispute about the admissibility of the medical

14

records.

15

MR. FOX:

16

THE COURT :

17

MR. FOX:

18

THE COURT :

19

MR. FOX:

20

THE COURT

21

MR. FOX:

22

25

There is?

Yes.
You do not intend to admit them?

No.
So what is your proof of treatment?
She was taken immediately from the stairs to

the hosp ital and was

23
24

There is.

THE COURT :

—
Is she just going to say what happened to

her?
MR. FOX:

That's correct.

-15-

2

She's noi presenting any evidence about how

THE, COURT

1

she was treated, what she received?
MR. FOX:

3

Well, she'll say what —

the treatment that

4

she received, that she was taken into surgery and they installed

5

an external fixator on her leg.

6

THE COURT

7

MR. FOX:

That's what happened to her.

8

THE COURT

How does she know that?

9

MR. FOX:

10

she —

How can she present testimony about that?

We have photographs to show her condition as

when she came out of surgery.
THE COURT :

11

Well, that's my question.

You're not going

12

to present any of this -- seemingly, that would require evidence

13

of people that know about those things.

14

MR. FOX:

15

THE COURT

16

Know about what?
How she was treated.

I
Was she awake when she

was treated?

17

MR. FOX:

She went into surgery -- she was taken from

18

the —

19

the emergency room.

20

into the hospital.

21

surgery on her leg, installed a fixator, and that's the treatment

22

she received.

23
24
25

I

she was taken from the stairs by BYU.

THE COURT:

She was taken to

From the emergency room she was admitted
While she was in the hospital they performed

Okay, but she's not qualified to say what

they did to her because she doesn't -MR. FOX:

No, only that they installed a fixator on her
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leg and that —

2
3

THE COURT

fixator on her leg, I assume.

4
5

MR. FOX:

No, no, it was an external fix --- you'll see a

picture of it.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. FOX:

8

She had been told that they installed a

Okay.
It's an external fixator.

It's a metal frame

about three inches larger in diameter than her leg.
THE COURT:

9

So it's a brace?

10

MR. FOX:

11

that fixator for 11 weeks.

12

THE COURT

And it was attached to her bone, and she wore
That was the treatment she received.

You don't intend to offer any medical

13

testimony as to how -- other than her statement of what she

14

observed.
MR. FOX:

15
16

her with a fixator on in the hospital.

17

THE COURT

18

MR. FOX:

19

THE COURT

20

MR. FOX:

So

—

We have the photographs to show that.
-- you've got the observation and the

Medical bills that we received that we paid is

also —

23

THE COURT

24

MR. FOX:

25

Yeah, okay.

photc graphs of the fixator, but that's the testimony about —

21
22

That's correct, and my statement that I saw

Medical bills.
Those are our damages, the medical bills and

the - - for the treatment that she received.
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2

THE COURT:

So these medicai records you do not intend

to offer?
Medical records from the doctors 9

3

MR. FOX:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. FOX:

Yeah.
No.

In fact, we believe that they contain

6

statements of an injured person, which are not admissible, since

7

we never saw those records until a year after.

8
9

THE COURT:

MR. FOX:
designate them m

We did not designate them.

THE COURT:

13

MR. FOX:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FOX:

—

THE COURT:

Okay.

Go ahead.
the

Have the defense identified those as

exhibits?
MR. FOX:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. FOX:

No.
They have not?

Well, I take it back.

In their exhibit list

they did have those medical records, yes.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. FOX:

25

in September.

We did not identify any of those —

19

22

You have not.

doctors.

17
18

We did not

our exhibits that we exchanged --

12

16

I

understood that you people had designated them.

10
11

Who described the medical records?

All right.

Go ahead.

So our case is that we believe that we can

educe sufficient evidence for a prima facie case using our lay

-18testimony.

2
3

THE COURT :

And really, the crux of this motion is what

you consider the 1 aw to be and whether that can be done by lay or

4 I expert.
5

MR. FOX:

6

THE COURT :

7

10

MR. FOX:

Go ahead.

I've interrupted you.

Well, if the Court's read -- I don't —

so if you

—
THE COURT :

Let me ask you one other question if I

could, then.

13

MR. FOX:

14

THE COURT :

Sure.
What do you say about the defect on the

15

stair?

16

to be the defect o f the stair?

Is it your position she will describe what she considers

MR. FOX:

17

She -- Mrs. Fox went there.

She came <down the stairs.

She purchased a

18

ticket.

19

mean she was just walking down the stairs.

20

normally take note of your position on the stairs or the

21

condition of the stairs --

22
23
24
25

I

really don't have anything to add that's not in our memorandum,

11
12

Okay.

Excuse me.

8
9

That's correct.

THE COURT :

She wasn't taking note -- I
I mean you don't

What I meant is Mr. Seller's argument about

causation relative to the stair; what do you say?
MR. FOX:

The causation is that —

we'll present ev

—

Ms. Fox's testimony that as she was coming down the stairs she
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stepped on a metal nose and she heard the metal nose then

2

clatter, and her foot slipped off the metal nose and she fell.

3

I'll testify that two days after she fell I went to BYU to return

4

the ticket she had purchased.

5

stairway, and I took photographs of the stairs to show the

6

deterioration -- general deterioration of the stairs generally.

7

Of course, we didn't have any knowledge of the stairway before

8

that.

9

where she had fallen.

While I was there I examined the

Then I took photographs of the stairs not knowing exactly
So after she had -- after she was released

10

from the hospital and had recovered sufficiently that we -- she

11

could travel —

12

stairway and found that they had been replaced.

13

been completely rebuilt.

it was about three weeks later -- we went to the

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FOX:

16

The stairway had

Three weeks later?

Well, it was actually started —

I believe the

construction started the 1st of May, around the 1st of May.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. FOX:

Following the fall?
Following the fall.

So it was within two

19

weeks of her fall that construction on the stairs had begun.

20

there was no opportunity for us to obtain an expert or to inspect

21

the stairs otherwise, except for the photographs that I have.

22

was m

23

I took the photographs of the stairs, and that's the

24

documentation we have for the condition of the stairs.

25

So

It

that time period between April 22nd and the 1st of May that

THE COURT:

Is there any evidence m

this matter about
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notice to BYU of the defective stair9

2

MR. FOX:

Yes.

A year before Mrs. Fox fell another

3

person fell on the stairs and broke his arm.

At that time BYU

4

started a process of replacing the stairway.

That will be in

5

testimony today.

6

in August of 2003 to April of 2004, that process was ongoing to

7

replace the stairway.

8
9

THE COURT:

To replace it.

They were gradually

reconstructing the stairs?

10
11

So from August -- I think the first request was

MR. FOX:

They weren't working on the stairs at all.

They --

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. FOX:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FOX:

What did you mean 9
They

—

That process was what?
Well, they go through —

apparently from the

16

documents I have they go through a process where someone requests

17

that some work by done.

18

process and a bid estimate process, and then they let it out for

19

bids.

20

scheduled to be performed.

21

this matter was signed on -- by the contractor on April 22nd, two

22

days after my wife fell.

23
24
25

It has to go through an evaluation

Then a contractor is selected, and then the work is

THE COURT:

The contract to repair the stairs in

To repair the stair, that meaning what?

They replace the treads or something?
MR. FOX:

They rebuilt the stairs.
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THE COURT:

2

MR. FOX:

They rebuilt9
They tore down the stairway and put a cap --

3

what they call a cap on it.

4

and handrails.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. FOX*

They capped the stairs, added treads

In the interim did they maintain the stairs9
I think there will be some evidence from the

7

defendant that they did make some repairs on the stairs.

8

respect to the duty and breach issue is we'll -- the plaintiff

9

has —

10

or the defendant has admitted that they didn't give any

notice as to the defective condition of the stairs.

11

THE COURT:

12

defendant has admitted what?

13

With

MR. FOX:

I don't understand that statement.

The

In request for admissions the defendant

14

admitted that no notice was given to Mrs. Fox regarding the

15

defective condition of the stairs.

16

defendant.

17
18
19

THE COURT:

Okay.

That was well known by the

That was my question.

The defective

condition which was well known is established by what testimony?
MR. FOX:

It will be by the fact that they were -- first

20

of all, the condition of the stairs when she fell, or the

21

photographs I have.

Also the fact that the defendant knew

22

THE COURT:

Well, that didn't put them on notice.

23

MR. FOX:

—

No, but what put them on notice was eight

24

months earlier one of their employees fell on the stairs, tripped

25

on a metal nosing and fell.

That put them on notice, and at that
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point the process began to repla -- to repair the stairway

2

total, to tear it down, recap it, whatever -- and they eventually

3

decided to recap the stairway —

4

they poured another layer of concrete over the steps and replaced

5

the metal nosings and added handrails that weren't there before.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR, FOX:

m

what they call a recap, which is

I see.

So I believe that's notice to the defendant

8

that the stairways were defective.

Whether or not they acted

9

reasonably, that's a question the Court will have to decide.

It

10

took them eight months to actually do the work.

11

fell it only took them two weeks to perform the actual work, or

12

to begin the actual work.

13
14

THE COURT:

Your position is that she slipped, fell and

broke her leg?

15

MR. FOX:

16

THE COURT:

That's correct.
And her health condition has to do with the

17

bone structure of her leg 9

18

MR. FOX:

There will be no evidence on her preexisting

19

condition, your Honor.

20

to testify regarding that.

21
22
23
24
25

After my wife

THE COURT:

As far as I know there's no one competent

Okay, but is that fact then I'm hearing as

described in the medical records, is that where it comes from?
MR. FOX:

No.

The doctors who examined her didn't

examine her with respect to her preexisting condition.
THE COURT:

I didn't ask that.

I'm wondering

—
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MR. FOX:

2

THE COURT:

3

Oh, I'm sorr>.
—

where -- what's the source of this

condition that's been described9

4

MR. FOX:

A year before Mrs. Fox fell -- approximately a

5

year before Mrs. Fox fell both she and I went to a doctor.

6

a problem with my knee; it was giving me some problems.

7

wanted to have her knee checked out.

8

our knees.

9

guess.

She had

X-rays were taken of both

We went at the same time, so it was a family thing, I

Anyway --

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. FOX:

12

I had

Well, at our age knees are a problem.
Yeah.

The doctor told her at that time that

she had some osteoarthritis in her right knee.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. FOX:

Her knee, not her leg bone?
No, not her leg bone, in her knee.

15

there was some missing cartilage in the knee.

16

was some partial cartilage missing.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. FOX:

Okay.

It was --

Partially -- there

I see.

But he didn't restrict her activities or ask

19

her to -- or gave her any prescription medicine or anything like

20

that.

21

would probably have to be replaced.

22
23
24
25

He just simply said that sometime in the future her knee

THE COURT:

Okay.

So you take the position her knee was

not unstable.
MR. FOX:
worked, she had a —

I think the evidence will show that she
she worked at a manual labor 30b that
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requirea her 10 carry heavy things, ana her knee didn't give her

2

any problem.

3

She exercised regularly.

THE COURT:

She --

But we don't have an expert that will speak

4 I on that subject?
5
6

MR. FOX:

There will be no medical testimony, your

Honor.

7

THE COURT:

I see.

8

MR. FOX:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else?

No, sir.

10

Mr. Seller?

11

MR. SEILER:

Thank you for your efforts.

Thank you, your Honor.

One of the things

12

that the plaintiffs allege is that they will not have anyone

13

testify about whether or not any treatment that Mrs. Fox received

14

was reasonable and necessary.

15

incapable of testifying as to whether or not those medical

16

services were reasonable and necessary.

17

expertise at all.

18

broken.

19

through the leg, I'm sorry.

20

She went to the hospital with a leg that hurt and was large and

21

she came out with a fixator.

22

fixator was attached.

23

been attached, we don't know what that reason was.

24
25

As to damages, Mrs. Fox is

She simply has no

She could not testify indeed that her bone was

The bone didn't protrude out through the arm —

or

There's no testimony about that.

She was presumably sedated when the

For whatever reason the fixator may have

We indeed have no testimony therefore that the arm is
or that the leg was broken.

I presumed that they would have

—

—
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you know, they identified some of the doctors as witnesses and I

2

figured they'd bring them.

3

in the world are they going to say -- how is the Court going to

4

know what happened with that knee?

5
6

THE COURT:

MR. SEILER:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

How -- what was the defense intention about

these medical records?

7

If they don't bring their doctors how

You made reference in your motion -Sure.

—

to these records.

Are you going to put

these records in?
MR. SEILER:

Well, we may run out and subpoena those

11

doctors if we have to, your Honor.

12

case without having anyone testify that any treatment that she

13

got was reasonable and necessary how is there any damage?

14

can there be any damage?

15
16

THE COURT:

If they intend to close their

Well, I understand that.

But that aside --

I'm speaking also of causation --

17

MR. SEILER:

18

THE COURT:

Sure.
—

and I understood your motion relied upon

19

this alternative medical condition proposition.

20

established?

21

How

MR. SEILER:

We'll end up —

How is that

right now apparently we

22

won't have them in the plaintiff's case, so we'll end up

23

subpoenaing Dr. Faux and Dr. Murdoch if the Court -- if the

24

plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss at the end of the

25

plaintiff's

case.
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THE COURT:

2

MR. SEILER:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. SEILER:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SEILER:

Have you identified these medical records?
Yes.
In your —

you have 9

Yes.
All right.
Without objection.

So we have -- you know,

7

we have this -- we h ave an injury to which there is no causation

8

test imony.

9

more than you can sa y, "When I fell my side hurt and after that

10

We don't know what caused that at this p o m t , any

the doctor told me my rib was broken."
THE COURT:

11

She fell --

Let me see if I can get the record

12

established.

I don' t know if we've got a dispute about this

13

recc rd, and 1then I could make a decision about the law.

14

MR. SEILER:

15

THE COURT:

Okay.
This seems to turn on the law not so much on

IOU take the position that it requires an expert to

16

the facts.

17

present this causation testimony.
MR. SEILER:

18
19

and —

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SEILER:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. SEILER:

24

THE COURT:

25

Both as to the defect in the stair, if any,

you —

The medical -—

as to whatever

—

The treatment.
-- medical treatment she may have received.
All right.

I've heard your position.

If I can interrupt you, Mr. Fox,
You do not agree with that

-27You take the position, do you nor, that a lay

1

positi on.

2

person —

3

and th e treatment she received?

Ms . Fox will testify as to ner condition

4

MR. FOX:

5

THE COURT

6

MR. FOX:

7

THE COURT

the fixator

Yes.
And the bills that s he received and pai cP
Yes.
Do you -- you do not dispute, then, in terms

8

of Mr. Seller's position that i.t's likely in this trial that he

9

would call --- who's the doctor, Mr . Fox?

10

MR. SEILER:

11

THE COURT

12

MR. FOX:

13

THE COURT-

14

MR. FOX:

15

THE COURT:

Dr. Faux and Dr. Mu rdoch.
Fox and Faux.

We' ve got Dr. Faux.

His name is spe.Lied di fferently, F-a- u-x.
Different name spell ing.
No relation.
Okay.

But he treated her.

I would assume

16

those medical records would come in on his testimony relative to

17

treatment.

Is that true 9

18

MR. FOX:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. FOX:

21
22
23
24
25

going to aid

That's possible.
Well

—

If the records come in I don't see how it's

—

THE COURT:

Do I have to hear this testimony to get to

that, though?
MR. FOX:

First of all, he wasn't identified as an

expert witness so under the rules I don't believe he can testify

|
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as

an expert at th.LS late date.

2
3

THE COURT :

But that's foundation.

This is just a

record.

4

MR. FOX:

5

going to say'?

6

unreasonably'?"

Okay.

Is he

If he comes in and testifies, what's he

g o mg to say, "I treated Mrs. Fox

Of course not.

7

THE COURT -

8

MR. FOX:

9

THE COURT :

I'm not

—

He won ' t say that.

10

MR. FOX:

11

THE COURT :

I'm not asking that.

Okay.
I'm really asking is it conceivable that

12

these medical records are going to be received by this Court?

13

Are you going to --

14

MR. FOX:

It's not going to happen, your Honor.

Well,

15

it might -- the Court can decide>.

16

not going to -- we' 11 ob: ect to the use of any medical records.

17

So

18

I will say that.

But we're

-THE COURT :

Well, my question is this.

Do I need to

19

hear this case, then, to see if I'm going to receive these

20

medi cal records?

21

may be dispositive .

I'm on a motion that needs decision making that
It's going to turn on whether I receive the

22 1 medical records or not.
23

MR. FOX:

24

THE COURT :

25

MR. FOX:

Okay.
That's what. I'm wondering.

So how do we approach that?

1

You're saying --

I
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THE COURT:

2

MR. FOX:

That's my question.
-- it's a factual issue whether or not you

3

receive the medical records?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. FOX:

6

THE COURT:
want to hear, I

Is that what you want to hear?

That's what I wanted -- well, not what I

—
I know, you want to know --

MR. FOX:

9

—

We're going to oppose the introduction of any

medical records in this case.

7
8

No, my question

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. FOX:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. FOX:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FOX:

-- just want to know --- what our position is.
-- what your position is.
That's our position.
I see.

What is the basis for that?

Well, first of all, we don't have a witness to

16

testi fy.

17

testi fy with regarcI to those medical records.

There's no witness been identified by the defense to

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. FOX:

All right.

It could be a custodian.

20

a custodian nor the doctors.

21

THE COURT:

22
23
24

document s.

Which would be, what, custodian?

All right.

They didn't identify

They told me they identified the

If they have not I guess I need to look at that.

MR. FOX:

Well, they have —

their di sclosure; I won't deny that.

they put the documents in
The documents were in

25 i there -- when we ex changed exhibits those documents were in their
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exhibits.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

tell me where I'm wrong.

This xS my question, then.

3

Is —

4

designated the documents as an exhibit I would allow a custodian

5

to give foundation as to the medical records.

6

expect I would probably receive these medical records.

7

unfair to presume such for purposes of this discussion on this

8

motion?

9

MR. FOX:

It seems conceivable they've

Where upon I would
Is it

The problem with that I foresee is that the

10

medical records contain conclusions that there will be no

11

foundation.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. FOX:

14

THE COURT:

Admittedly they would.
So that's the only

—

But they are what they are, and the parties

15

can bring in evidence and testimony regarding the content of the

16

records.

17

be before me, and that's why I'm asking.

18

I have to -- otherwise I've got to do this.

19

motion and ask you to bring m

20

testimony and see if the records come in or not.

21

I'll do.

22
23

That's what trials are about.

But those records would
I don't know why -- if
I'll defer this

the custodian and we'll hear the
That's what

Then I can address the motion.
MR. SEILER:

Your Honor, may I —

we may not have to go

there.

24

THE COURT:

Well, that's —

25

important premise because --

I know, but this is an
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MR. SEILER:

2

THE COURT:

I understand m a t .
-- it's part of theJ discussion of whether or

3

not her condition is such and so.

4

records and they dispute it admittedly.

5

MR. SEILER:

6

THE COURT:

7

You suggest this base d on the

Your Honor, can I -- may I just
All right.

—

You've objected to the records.

Go ahead --

8

MR. FOX:

9

THE COURT:

I object to --

10

MR. FOX:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SEILER:

-- Mr. Seller.
- the records, your Honor.
Go ahead, Mr. Seller.
Your Honor, I thirLk we've learned that

13

there wi 11 be no med ical records in the plaintiff's case

14

chief.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SEILER:

in

I understand that.
If there are no me dical records in the

17

plaintiff's case in chief how do you get any evidence in about

18

what is reasonable a nd necessary --

19

THE COURT:

I understood that, but my question had to do

20

with you r theory that it clearly was her condition.

21

before me?

22

MR. SEILER:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SEILER:

25

How is that

It probably isn't until we call -That's my question.
—

the doctor, and that's probably true.

But we h ave --- we al ready have plaintiff 's representation that
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they're not going to put m

2

causation was

3

or not the mejdical record —

4

treatment, wrlatever it is that she received, was reasonable and

5

necessary.

6

on her and sent her home.

or whe ther or not the medical

Maybe what they should have done is put an ice pack

THE COURT:

8

MR. SEILER:

10

any testimony about what the

They 're not going to say one thing about whether

7

9

I understand.
You know, so if there is no such testimony

then I don't know ho w they can ever prove the damage.

You see

what I'm saying?

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SEILER:

I do.
Okay.

I just want to make sure I wasn't --

13

sometimes I think I understand some thing so well that I don't

14

explain it very well

15

THE COURT:

16

is part of it, too.

17
18
19

MR. SEILER:

No, but that's part of it and this condition

Right.

What was her condition9

Was her

bone broken?
THE COURT:

Well, that isn 't established by -- I agree

20

that whether the cause of the breaking of the bone might relate

21

to the condition as is described in the medical records.

22

MR. SEILER:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

;

Exactly.
That's why I'm wondering whether the medical

records might be coming in or not.
MR. SEILER:

So -- but we do have the other causation

|
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issue, your Honor, and that is what was the condition of the

2

stairs.

3

THE COURT:

4 I

MR. SEILER:

(Jh-huh.
We have Mrs. Fox saying she doesn't know

5

the location where she fell.

6

where she fell, how can she say what's wrong with it?

7

Furthermore, her testimony in her deposition was to the effect

8

that she went down the stairs -- or as she went up the stairs she

9

heard some clinking.

10

foot slide out.

11

defect.

12
13

If she doesn't know the location of

As she came down the stairs she saw her

It doesn't say that she saw that there was some

So if she can't -THE COURT:

The testimony is that she heard the clinking

of the tread going up?

14

MR. SEILER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SEILER:

Yes.
But not coming down?
I'm not sure if she says that coming down

17

or not, your Honor.

18

deposition, to be candid with the Court as I try to be.

19

point is, your Honor, how do we know what the reasonable repair

20

system is, what was damaged at the time on the stairs?

21

know that.

22

I'd have to go back and look at her
But my

We don't

If he can't know that how can he go forward?

We have no expert that says this is how you're supposed

23

to repair the stairs, this is when you're supposed to repair

24

them.

25

year --

This is -- you know, you ought to have a one week, a 10-
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1

(Inaudible) ge neralized one tnar the stairs

' THE COURT:

2

are def ective as a v.rhole, they were put on notice eight months

3

before these stairs are defective?
MR. SEILER:

4
5

Honor.

I don't think that that's even close, your

What if a road was defective as a whole?

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SEILER:

Is that their position?
That is their position.

They think that

8

because someone fell on some stair that we don't kn ow what stair

9

it was, that that somehow means that all the stairs are

10

defective, and m d e e d that witness \/v/ill testify he' s not sure

11

what ma de him fall.

12

there was a maintenance program.

13

maintenance done.

14

tread -- or every single metal nosi ng, I'm sorry, on the tread

15

that was loose.

16

things.

17

the Court on the plaintiff's behalf the inspection program nor

18

the rep air program was not what you should do.

20 1 records
21

1

After that the testimony is qu ite clear that
I mean there was a significant

They went back and screwed down every single

The y inspected it daily and those kind of

We have no testimony -- we have nobody who will say to

THE COURT:

19

j

Okay.

Not (inaudible).

I'm going to return bac k to the

You've designated the med ical records but not a

custodi an expert wit ness?

22

MR. SEILER:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SEILER:

25

THE COURT:

I better look , your Honor, before I -Would you?
Before I spea k out of turn.
All right.

1
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(Counsel confers with Mr. Thomas)

2

THE COURT:

I notice, Mr. Fox, while he's looking that

3

you have designated Dr. Faux as a witness.

4

call him?

5

MR. FOX:

Did you not intend to

We had designated him as a witness, but

m

6

view of the fact that the defense had not identified any experts,

7

nor had they identified any custodian for medical records, we

8

decided not to call him as a witness.

9

THE COURT:

10
11

MR. SEILER:
your Honor.

I see.
I'm having trouble finding this pleading,

I'm sorry.

12

THE COURT:

13

brief minute recess to look?

14

MR. SEILER:

15

THE COURT:

16

If that wouldn't offend the Court any.
We'll take a recess and

I'll consider your pleadings while we're waiting.
MR. SEILER:

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you, your Honor.

I think I'll reread some of this.

Thank

you.

20

MR. FOX:

21

COURT BAILIFF:

22

(Short recess taken)

23

COURT BAILIFF:

24

THE COURT:

25

Do you want to take a

That would be fine.

17

19

That's all right.

You're welcome.
All rise.

This Court is again m

Please be seated.

both parties and Counsel are present.

session.

I'll note for the record
Mr. Seller?
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MR. SEILER:

ies,

your Honor.

Your Honor, I would point

2

the Court to the plaintiff's witness list for trial, which

3

includes Dr. Jonatha n Faux as a party to likely -- it says --

4

indicates witnesses plaintiffs expect to call at trial.

5

that we're entitled to rely upon those people they expect to

6

call.

7

witness list other than there is one that has all the fact

I think that is the rule.

:

I think

I did not find a separate

8 1 witnesses that is part of the exhibits that we've provided to
9

Counsel -- or the opposing party.

10
11

THE COURT:

So you designated the treating physician as

a fact witness?

12

MR. SEILER:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SEILER:

No.

No, no, that's not --

What did you do?

1

The plaintiff's witness list for trial

15

includes Dr. Jonathan Faux as a party expected to be called at

16

trial.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SEILER:

19

Okay.

And then I didn't want the Court to think

we didn't give the Court

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SEILER:

I see.

—

Oh, I beg your pardon.

Go ahead.

I didn't want you to believe that there was

22

no witness list.

23

witnesses that was p>art of the exhibit list and was designated

24

our exhibit designat ion.

25 i

There was a witness list of by and large fact

THE COURT:

You designated all fact witnesses?

m
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MR. SEILER

Yes, but that does not include Dr

Faux on

2

this list.

3

it does -- he is included on the plaintiff's witness list for

4

trial as one that is expected to be called, and reasonably we

5

should.

6

I don't want the Court to be misled aboat that.

THE COURT:

I see.

Okay.

I'm of the mind —

All right.

But

Let me ask you

7

this question.

I believe that this motion has

8

critical aspects to the substantial issues of the case, and I

9

understand your position.

I'm also concerned about these medical

10

records as to how it may affect this motion.

11

Court would exercise its discretion to allow the calling of a

12

custodian of the records.

13

called that person would come m

14

Regional Medical Center keeps records -- medical records in the

15

regular course of their business."

16
17
18

Therefore, the

Presumably if that custodian were
and say, "Yes, Utah Valley

I assume, Mr. Fox, that you objected to the medical
records because there's not designated custodian; is that true 9
MR. FOX:

Also to the information contained in the

19

medical records.

First of all, the medical records won't --

20

didn't -- do not diagnose Mrs. Fox's preexisting condition.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. FOX:

23
24
25

They don't what?
They don't diagnose her preexisting condition.

There's no information in there on that.
THE COURT:

I'm not speaking to that.

I'm speaking to

the admissibility of these records and what your objection would
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be about the records, which seemingly would come in witn a

2

custodian.

Are you --

3

MR. FOX:

They did not identify a custodian.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. FOX:

Okay, this is my question now.

Okay.

For the Court's information, if the

6

Court will check the record, we did subpoena Dr. Faux but decided

7

not to bring him because there was no -- because the defense did

8

not designate a custodian or a doctor.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. FOX:

Because of what?

Because they did not designate a custodian or

11

a doctor and there was no way they could bring m

12

records.

medical

So that's why we didn't --

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. FOX:

15

THE COURT:

Yeah, I understand that.

We released Dr. Faux from that subpoena.
Okay.

All right.

Back to my question,

16

then.

17

could lay foundation for the admission of these records.

18

would your objection be?

19

If the custodian were called, presumably the custodian

MR. FOX:

My objection would —

What

well, as far as the

20

custodian is concerned, the only objection we would have is that

21

the custodian was not identified in pre-trial disclosures, and we

22

prepared our case on that basis, your Honor.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

Okay.

objection.
MR. FOX:

Yes.

That's what I assumed would be your
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2

THE COURT:

because a custodian was not identified.

3

MR. FOX:

4

THE COURT:

5

That's correct.

MR. FOX:

7

THE COURT:

9
10
11
12

I think that's what I said.

Is that your

objection?

6

8

You object to tne calling of a custodian

Yes.
So your objection is over the course

discretion to allow the calling of a custodian.
MR. FOX:

Yes.

THE COURT:

All right.

Would you have any other

objection?
MR. FOX:

Well, I have an objection to the records

13

themselves because if you're going to call the custodian, the

14

custodian of the -- it depends on which records we're talking

15

about, the --

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. FOX:

18

Dr. Faux's records.

19

THE COURT:

20

Are they different?

Let me put it --- hospital records or we're talking about
We'd talk about two separate custodians.
I guess I understood them to be the same.

21

MR. FOX:

They're different.

22

MR. SEILER:

There are —

the records we would ask the

23

custodian to testify about are from IHC, and they are on the date

24

of the injury.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

These are the hospital records.
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2

MR. FOX:

Well, than makes it incomplete, your Honor,

because tnen that puts --

3

THE COURT:

I'm only looking for what they're relying

They identify them as those hospital records.

4

on

5

what they are.

6

MR. FOX:

Well, the problem is the content of the

7

record.

8

of the doctor's examination.

9

physician.

10

I don't know

The content of the record may or may not be the result

THE COURT:

Dr. Murdoch was not the treating

I'm not getting into that.

Okay, this is my

11

question, then.

I'm going to defer this case and allow —

12

take a recess and I'll allow you to go get your custodian,

13

Mr. Seller.

14

in.

15

admission of these records --

we'll

I'm interested to know if these records are coming

I'm simply asking you whether you're going to object to the

16

MR. FOX:

I will.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. FOX:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. FOX:

21

THE COURT:

—

based on foundation.

That's correct.
So if I call this custodian

And then he establishes
—

~

—

you don't think this custodian is going

22

to answer that question did they keep these records m

23

regular course

the

—

24

MR. FOX:

25

THE COURT:

I'm sure they will.
And would they not then be admitted?
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MR. FOX:

The only other objection we'd have is that

2

they contain information of an injured person's statement that's

3

not admissible.

4

That would be our other reservation.

THE COURT:

Well, the records are going to be m

and

5

you're going to dispute what they -- I assume you dispute that

6

she even made those statements.

7

MR. FOX:

8

THE COURT:

9

That's correct.
But those are contained in a history, and

they would be part of the medical record that you dispute.

10

that not true?

11

just trying to understand --

12

Is

I'm not trying to quarrel with you about it, I'm

MR. FOX:

I understand what you're saying.

If you're

13

going to allow them to establish a foundation for admitting the

14

medical records

—

15

THE COURT:

16

view a custodian --

17

MR. FOX:

18

accept that.

19

make.

20

Yeah, based on a custodian, because I don't

—

then that's the Court's discretion and I

The Court is well aware of the objection that we'll

THE COURT:

That's what I'm trying to do is make a

21

record of your objection.

22

MR. FOX:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. FOX:

25

THE COURT:

That's fine.
Okay.

And that's our objection.
Do you need to require this?

Do you want me
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1

to defer this and get this casiodian or can you stipulate to

2

that?

3

MR. FOX:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. FOX:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. FOX:

8

Well, now you're taking

That's what I'm asking you.
No.

I think that the custodian should come --

I'll defer it, then.

Okay.

I think the custodian -- so we can

examine the custodian on foundation.

9

THE COURT:

All right.

I'm going to do this because I

10

think it's efficient as to this case.

11

this case goes.

12
13

—

MR. FOX:

It may determine where

And I'm not arguing at all with the Court in

that regard.

14

THE COURT:

But just —

15

stipulations and some cannot.

16

simply asking.

17

MR. FOX:

18

THE COURT:

but some people can make
I understand that.

I'm just

We would not stipulate to the foundation.
All right.

Then we're going to take a

19

recess.

Mr. Seller, I'm going to direct that you seek out a

20

custodian for the medical records.

21

resume with that custodian.

22

MR. SEILER:

23

MR. FOX:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. FOX:

When you're ready we'll

Thank you, your Honor.

So will he

—

We'll do it now.
I assume that's going to take some time.
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THE COURT:

2

MR. FOX:

3

back 9

Yes.

We're going to take a recess for that.

So should we stay here this morning or we come

How do you want to handle that 9

4

THE COURT:

You can —

5

advise me when you're ready.

6

hour or two and he' 11 -- you can communicate as to what you think

7

you should do in that interim.

8

MR. SEILER:

9

THE COURT:

You can leave your materials.

Thank you.

COURT BAILIFF:

11

(Recess taken)

12

COURT BAILIFF:

13

THE COURT:

15

I assume it could be done within an

Thank you, your Honor.

10

14

I'll take a recess and you can

All rise.

This Court is in recess.

We're again in session.

Please be seated.

My clerk advises me that

you had some discussion.
MR. SEILER:

Yes, your Honor.

We have had some

16

discussion and have determined that we simply won't offer those

17

medical records.

18

Medical Service people who have the same -- for our purposes the

19

same information, that is that she said that her leg went out

20

from underneath her.

21

We do have witnesses as to the Emergency

THE COURT:

Well, no, the purpose and intent of my

22

discussion is to be able to make a decision on this motion

23

knowing what the record is.

24
25

MR. SEILER:
medical records —

What is the record?

I think the record is is that the two

one from Dr. Faux and one from Dr. Murdoch

—
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at least at this point aren't admitted

2

admitted we <don't know.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. SEILER:

5

THE COURT:

6

Whether they'll ever be

No, my question is not that.
Okay.
My question is is how are these sta tements

that you ref<3r to in your motion made of record for the motion.

7

MR. SEILER:

And what we're suggesting to the Court is

8

that the record from the emergency medical technician or medical

9

service personnel to the same effect is what the Court can rely

10

upon.

It sa_ys, "Upon arrival" --

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SEILER:

Is that a deposition?
It is in the sworn testimony of Nolan

13

Converse that we took his trial testimony pursuant to th<B Court's

14

order.

15

I have both.

I do have a copy of that transcribed and I have a disc.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SEILER:

18

He is what 9
He was the Emergency Medical Service person

on the scene -- one of the two.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SEILER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. SEILER:

23

let me find it here.

24

going down stairs."

25

it says, "Patient re ported she was going down the stairs when her

So he's made some record?
He has.
A report, rather?
He's made a report, and the report says

—

It says, "Knee went out as patient was
That's in one report.

In the other report
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knee gave out ana she fell down one srair."

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SEILER:

In both cases the --

Both reports from Mr. Converse9
Yes.

Mr. Converse supervised Mr. Starr,

4

who will be here to testify, and is on our witness list.

5

supervised Mr. Starr as he wrote this, told him generally what to

6

write, the handwritten one.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SEILER:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. SEILER:

11

THE COURT:

Just follow my questions for a minute.
Okay.
I don't mean to confuse the matter

—

or make it complicated, but I just want

to understand the record.

13

foundation for this report?

Mr. Converse has —

14

MR. SEILER:

For each of them.

15

THE COURT:

Of the two reports?

16

MR. SEILER:

Yeah.

he would lay the

There are

—

There's one that's handwritten,

there's one that's dictated, as with Mr. Starr.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SEILER:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SEILER:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. SEILER:

24

THE COURT:

25

—

No.

12

17

He

expected

—

And he was the

—

Emergency Medical Service
—

—

EMT that responded?

Right.

They're volunteers.

And you deposed him?
Yes, pursuant to the Court's order.
And this is a designated witness and this is
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1

MR. SEILER:

2

THE COURT:

3

Yes.
Okay.

Now that's how yoL would get it

m.

Is this something yo u agree is part of the record or not?

4

MR. SEILER:

I'm not sure that Mr. Fc>x does or doesn't

5

agree that's part of the record, but it's certainly rIOW it would

6

come

m , and

it has

]been given to the Court --

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SEILER:

9

THE COURT:

10

That's my question.
—

in affidavit form.

Let me —

I don't —

the reason why

I'm

asking ---

11

MR. SEILER:

12

THE COURT:

Maybe I misunderstood.
-- this question, Mr. Sei ler, sc that you

13

understand is that you've brought a motion in limine, and this

14

discussion is about do I need to hear all this testimony to

15

address this m o t i o n 9

16

testimony we' 11 hear it and then we'11 make a motion, but it

17

just -- it wastes our time.

18

MR. SEILER:

19

THE COURT:

20

the motion.

21

or what should I do.

22

MR. SEILER:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SEILER:

25

If you want to just get down tc hearing the

I -If you can agree to this record I can hear

If not, then I' ve got to decide I f I should call him

Okay.
How is this record before me?
The record is before you in the. way of an

affidavit from Mr. Converse and in the way of the Court ordered

1
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trial testimony that was tak en last week m

Missouri.

Mr. Fox, is that true 9

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. FOX:

4

to the s tatement, though.

5

because under the statute an injured person's statement can't be

6

admitted •

What he says is t rue, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. FOX:

9

Okay.

We object

I think l t's a foundational objection

An injured person's statement what?
An injure d person 's statement.

Under the

statute an injured person's statement is not admissible into

10

evidence unless that person is given an opportunity to disavow

11

the stat ement within 15 days

12

foundational question whether or not they can even use that

13

statement in evidence.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SEILER:

16
17
18

Okay.

THE COURT:

Let's move on to that, then.

Okay.

I have a copy of the statute, too,

interrupting you?

Could I ask you another question
Is her arthritic condition before the Court?

MR. SEILER:

20

MR. FOX:

21

MR. SEILER:

It is.

Well —

no, it isn't.

It is in this sense.

She testified that

she had one and it's in her deposition.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SEILER:

25

So it's a

which Mr . Fox refers.

19

22

That never happened.

of her leg.

She testified to what?
That she had an artheoarthritic condition
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THE COURT:

2

MR. SEILER:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. SEILER:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SEILER:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SEILER:

9

Okay.
Or knee.
She doesn't dispute her condition9
Excuse m e 9
She does not dispute her condition?
No, your Honor.
Go ahead.
Okay.

So we have a statute that says --

and I've given the Court a copy of it -- 78-27-33, statement of

10

an injured person.

11

Act any statement, either written or oral, obtained from an

12

injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while this

13

person was confined m

a hospital or sanitarium as a result of

14

injuries sustained m

the occurrence which statement is obtained

15

by a person whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to

16

the injured person, except a peace officer, shall not be

17

admissible as evidence m

18

against the injured person for damages sustained unless/' and

19

there's some exceptions there.

20

portions apply.

21

It says, ''Excepted otherwise provided in this

any civil proceeding brought by or

I don't believe the exception

So we have two different things to talk about, your

22

Honor.

One is how is the volunteer Emergency Medical Service

23

personnel's interest adverse to Mrs. Fox.

24

there was potentially a malpractice claim that time has come and

25

gone as it happened m

April of 2004.

It is not adverse.

It's a two-year statute.

If
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The second question is how is this -- how can --

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SEILER:

Who did Mr. Converse work for?
He didn't work for anybody.

He was a

4

volunteer for Brigham Young Univ -- for the Emergency Medical

5

Service team at BYU, but there's no employment.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SEILER:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

Well, is he a volunteer employee?
Not a employee, he's a volunteer volunteer.
Is he a voluntary agent of BYU?

Is he

adverse because he's a volunteer agent?
MR. SEILER:

No, he's not an agent, your Honor.

He's

11

simply a person that volunteers his time and goes to scenes when

12

he's told to go.

13

he shows up.

You tell them that there's somebody injured and

He drives a van that is provided for --

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SEILER:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SEILER:

Is it -Excuse me.
Go ahead.
That BYU provides.

So the first question

18

is is how is Mr. Converse or Mr. Starr adverse to the plaintiff?

19

His interests are not adverse.

20

to somebody that's adverse.

21

THE COURT:

22
23

agent of BYU.

The statement simply isn't given

Secondly, your Honor, the

Well, what's his position?

—

He seems like an

Why isn't he an agent of BYU?

MR. SEILER:

24

doesn't have any --

25

THE COURT:

Because he's a volunteer, your Honor.

He

A volunteer doesn't mean he's not an agent.
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2

MR. SEILER:

Well, he aoesn't have any relationship witn

BYU other -- well, he was a student, but other than --

3

THE COURT:

I mean he's authorized to do this even as a

4

volunteer.

5

He's seemingly -- he's not working for their benefit or their

6

behest or -- he's implemented by them.

7 J

He can't just go in there without their approval.

MR. SEILER:

8

volunteer his time.

9

THE COURT:

10

time.

Why isn't he an agent?

Because all he does, your Honor, is

Well, I understand that he volunteers his

I understand he's a volunteer.

11

MR. SEILER:

12

THE COURT:

Okay.
But it's not like he has authority to go to

13

BYU just by a person that decides to help people.

14

were doing this by himself?

15

going to be your EMT?

16

MR. SEILER:

17

THE COURT:

18
19
20
21

What if he

Could he just go up and say,

I'll respond to all"

xv

I'm

—

He could but didn't.
No, he has to do it at their behest, doesn't

he?
MR. SEILER:

Could but didn't.

and say, "I'll help."
THE COURT:

Anybody could show up

That's true.
You mean you could decide to respond as an

22

EMT on campus at BYU with your van to provide medical treatment

23

for people if you chose to?

24
25

MR. SEILER:
not what happened, but

That's actually true, your Honor.
—

That's
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THE COURT:

2

MR. SEILER:

3

THE COURT:

You could just go around and do that 9
The persons that are -Well, let's suppose you could do, but the

4

fact that he volunteers doesn't mean -- I just don't understand

5

why he's not an agent.

6

MR. SEILER:

Okay.

7

position.

8

there's no consequence.

9

consequence to him.

10

THE COURT:

Again, your Honor, it's a volunteer

It is like if -- if he didn't want to go on a shift
If he just didn't show up there's no

But if he does, does that mean that he

You don't think they direct him9

—

11

okay.

12

they do provide him with the implements you don't think he's then

13

under their umbrella?

14

MR. SEILER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SEILER:

If he does show up and

I don't think so.
They don't direct him9
They don't direct him.

They do field calls

17

because calls will go the EMT volunteer service.

It's not a

18

police department thing, it's over at the Wilkinson Center, and

19

they make calls and dispatch and they show up at the calls.

20

the Court can decide if that person is governed m

21

BYU, but the person has no adverse interest.

22

interest is not adverse to --

23

THE COURT:

24

might be if he's their agent.

25

MR. SEILER:

So

some way by

Mr. Converse's

Well, that's the question of an agency.

He

And I understand that part of the problem.
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If -- you know, frankly, I think he's okay, but I'm not -- that's

2

not where I -- that's not the end of this discussion.

3

statute, however, your Honor, is simply unconstitutional.

4

reason it's unconstitutional is based upon Article 8 Section 4 of

5

the Utah Constitution.

6

Article 4 of the Utah Consti —

This
The

or Article 4 Section --

7

I'm sorry, Article 8 Section 4 of the Utah Constitution says,

8

"The Utah Supreme Court shall adopt rules and procedure -- Rules

9

of Procedure and Evidence to be used m

the courts of the state,

10

and shall by rule manage the appellate process.

11

may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the

12

Supreme Court by a vote of two-thirds of all members of both

13

houses of legislature.

14

Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize" -- now

15

we're beyond where it applies.

16

The legislature

Except as otherwise provided in this

So you have the Utah Supreme Court adopting the Rules of

17

Evidence.

Then we have the Court's minute entry that discusses

18

this matter.

19

from Pat Bartholomew of this Court, your Honor.

20

"Pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 Section 4 the

21

Constitution of Utah as amended, the Court adopts all existing

22

statutory Rules of Procedure and Evidence not inconsistent or

23

superceded by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence heretofore

24

adopted by this Court."

25

statute in question was adopted the Court says, "We'll take the

The first page is the fax cover sheet from the

—

It says,

So in 1985 after the time that the
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statutory rules that aren't inconsistent."

2

Court rules --

3
4

THE COURT:

According to Utah

So you're suggesting that this declared that

statute unconstitutional9

5

MR. SEILER:

Absolutely.

Well, it's —

the Constitution

6

says the Supreme Court makes the Rules of Evidence.

7

adopts all of the rules not inconsistent with their own rules.

8
9

THE COURT:

The Court

Are you suggesting, then, that that ruling

of 1985 declared that statute unconstitutional?

10

MR. SEILER:

It doesn't declare it dead on, your Honor.

11

What it says is is that the only Rules of Evidence that remain

12

are those that are not inconsistent with the rules adopted by the

13

Utah Supreme Court.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SEILER:

Okay.

Is it inconsistent9

Yes, absolutely.

It's inconsistent with

16

Rule 803(4), statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or

17

treatment.

18

treatment and ascribing medical history for present or past

19

symptoms, pain or sensations or the inception, or general

20

character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as

21

reasonably pertinent to be —

22

all" —

23

hearsay rule.

24
25

"Statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or

they're not excluded.

or to diagnosis or treatment are
They're all exceptions to the

So then we have from the Utah Court Rules at the last
sentence of the second paragraph of the document I just provided
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to the Court, "Any existing statutes inconsistent with these

2

rules, if and when these rules are adopted by the Supreme Court,

3

will be impliedly repealed."

4

Civil Procedure and the Court Rules indicate that the statute is

5

repealed, the very statute that is the subject of the objection.

6

Then in Rule 803 —

So the Court adopts the Rules of

let's see, I already read 803.

7

Never mind, your Honor.

8

Section 78-27-33 was adopted in 1973, if that's helpful to the

9

Court, which would be some 12 years before the Court (inaudible).

10

Then we have the history that shows when

So it's my position, your Honor, that the state

11

legislature -- this statute is unenforceable, and frankly,

12

unconstitutional and violative of Section 8 of the Utah

13

Constitution.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

So the crux of this question,

15

then, is the Court would have to make a decision about the

16

admissibility of these reports of Mr. --

17
18

MR. SEILER:

And the testimony of Mr. Converse and

Mr. Starr.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SEILER:

21

THE COURT:

Mr. Converse.

Is that right?

That's correct, your Honor.
I assume —

I'll hear from Mr. Fox, but I

22

assume he takes a different view; is that right 9

23

But let me make sure I understand this, Mr. Seller.

24

motion, then, is standing on the statement that you made that you

25

would —

All right.
Your

that nhe record would be established with the deposition

-

1

testimon y of Mrs. Fo x where she does not dispute her medical

2

condition, and then Mr. Converse and Mr. Starr is it 9

3

MR. SEILER:

4

THE COURT:

5

Yes.
And the reports of her statements upon

treatment?
MR. SEILER:

Yes, sir.
Which you think are admissible under this

THE COURT:
theory?

9

MR. SEILER:

10
11

I do.
And given that, you think that poses an

THE COURT:

alternat lve 1bheory on causation?

12

MR. SEILER:

It does.

13

THE COURT:

All right.

14

MR. SEILER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. FOX:

Anythin g else?

I think not, your Honor.
Then I'll hear from Mr. Fox.

S ince the defendant h asn't raised the issue

17

constitutionality of the statute until now, I'm not really

18

prepared to address that.

19

been bef Dre the defe ndant for quite some time -- for months or

20

years.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. FOX:

23
24
25

Our reliance \jpon this st atute has

How do I know that?
I think m

You

—

the motion for summary judgment

that the Court decided last summer it was raised in that.
THE COURT:

Well, that 'may be true, but

trial so I guess I've got to decide --

I'm still at
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MR. FOX:

Okay.

2

to Utah (3ode 78-27--36.

3

one copy

I'd like to draw the Court's attention
I have a copy of it here.

I only have

It's just fortuitous that I even have that.

4

THE COURT :

5

MR. FOX:

It's 27-36?

Section 878-27-36.

It's a short sentence that

6

merely says that, "The rights provided by this Act are intended

7

to be in addition to and not in lieu of any rights of recission,

8

rules of evidence or provisions otherwise existing in the law."

9

I think Lt' S clear that the legislature in enacting the injured

10

person' s statute had in -- took -- enacted that statute in view

11

of the Rules of Evidence.

12

THE COURT

13

MR. FOX:

1

But they're inconsistent; are they not?
No, they're in addition to.

They're not

14

inconsistent at all.

Article 78 subsection (27) contains a host

15

of rules that are m

addition to other statutes, the comparative

16

negligence statute being one of those.

17

negligence changed the law with respect to affirmative defenses.

18
19

THE COURT :

1
1

You know, the comparative

Well, I guess I misunderstood that

78-27-33 —

1

J

20

MR. FOX:

21

THE COURT :

22

MR. FOX:

23

THE COURT :

24

MR. FOX:

25

THE COURT

No, 36 is the one I'm referring to.

1

I understand.

Uh-huh.
I'm referring to 33 now.

Okay, 33, but -Is nor —

you disagree chat 33 is not

1
1
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inconsistent with the Rules of Evidence that's cited by

2

Mr. Seller?

3

MR. FOX: I agree that it's inconsistent with that Rule

4

of Evidence, that's correct.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. FOX: That's the problem.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. FOX: It is a foundational issue that a statement

9

That's the problem.

Okay.

made by an injured person is not admissible in evidence, and what

10

I'm —

unless that person receives a copy of the statement and

11

has —

within 15 days of making the statement

12

opportunity then to disavow the statement.

13

that Section 36 indicates that the legislature enacted that in

14

view of the Rules of Evidence.

15

Rules of Evidence; they were --

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. FOX: Okay.

18

THE COURT:

and has an
What I'm saying is

It wasn't like they ignored the

I understood that, but —

— -I guess my question is what if they say

19

that, but the two rules are inconsistent, then I'm still left

20

with this problem of inconsistency --

21

MR. FOX: That's correct.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. FOX: That's correct.

24

THE COURT:

25

you.

—

and I've got to make a decision.

So I'm just

trying to make sure I'm with
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MR. FOX:

I think the Court understands the problem

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. FOX:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. FOX:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. FOX:

—

Okay.
—

and I understand it also.
Okay.

There is seemingly an inconsistency.

That's correct.
All right.

Go ahead.

That's -- and what we have m

the reports,

8

what the evidence will show is that when we took the deposition

9

of Mr.

—

10

MR. SEILER:

Converse.

11

MR. FOX:

Converse, I asked him what the purpose of

—

12

his report was, and he said the purpose of the report was a

13

medical/legal report.

14

something comes up with regard to the services that they render.

15

It's a medical/legal report unless

So I believe that the report itself has the potential of

16

being adverse.

Mr. Converse testified that he was an EMT -- a

17

licensed EMT, that he worked for the Emergency Medical Services

18

at BYU, which is a volunteer organization, • but nevertheless an

19

organization of BYU.

20

that he used BYU's truck, BYU's splint, BYU's equipment.

21

received the call from BYU's dispatcher.

22

we can make an argument that he is an agent of BYU, and there is

23

at least a potential for adversity m

That he was -- his services were voluntary,

They —

He

so I think that

the record that he kept.

24 * He identified the record as a medical/legal record, which applies
25

that it has some adverse characteristics.
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2

THE COURT :

So you think he's potentially adverse and

governe d by this --- what do you say

3

MR. FOX:

—

Well, he is potentially adverse and now he' s

4

become adverse because he reported things that we dispute, so

5

he's an adverse --

6

THE COURT :

7

MR. FOX:

8

THE COURT :

9
10

Okay.

He's put himself in an adverse position.
What do you say about the other arguments

about - - that Mr. Seller made about the rules and the -- his
stateme nt?

11

MR. FOX:

12

THE COURT :

With respect to the consti -You still think -- you don't -- the

13

inconsi stenc^/ arqurnents, unconstitutionality, do \'ou have amy

14

response to this?

15

MR. FOX:

As far as constitutionality is concerned, I

16

don't have a response because I'm not prepared -- this is the

17

first I've heard of this argument and so we're not prepared to

18

address that at this time.

19

modification of the Rules of Evidence, that's for sure, and it's

20

a foundational issue, and that's our position, your Honor, on

21

that.

22

into evidence unless there is —

23

established.

24

aff

25

As far as inconsistency, it's a

They can't admit that —

the injured person's statement
certain foundation is

We don't have that foundation.

Mr. Converse in his

—
THE COURT:

I guess I don't understand.

I mean I
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understand what the statute says, but I don't understand what

2

you're saying.

3

things."

4

Supreme Court has essentially declared it unconstitutional

5

because it's inconsistent with the rules that they've adopted.

6

That's what I understand it to be.

He's saying, "Well, this statute has these

If I understood his argument he's suggesting that the

7

MR. FOX:

8

THE COURT:

9
10
11

1

I -- that's probably his position, yes.
And you say you're not prepared to address

that today.
MR. FOX:

We're not prepared to address the

constitutionality of the issue.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. FOX:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FOX:

16

THE COURT:

17

Mr. Seller?

18

MR. SEILER:

1

And you still stand on statute?
That's correct.
Okay.
And that's our position.
All right.

That helps.

Thank you.

Your Honor, I believe the Supreme Court's

19

ruling and the Utah Constitution is clear that if there is an

20

inconsistency, which Mr. Fox has agreed with the Court there is

21

one between the statute and the Rules of Evidence that the

22

statute is ineffective.

23

think there's any question.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. SEILER:

That makes it ineffective.

I don't

How is it ineffective?
It is ineffective because it is an attempt

1
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to -- it is inconsistent with the Rules of Evidence adopted by

2

the Utah Supreme Court.

3
4

THE COURT:

MR. SEILER:

6

THE COURT:

Okay.
Specifically let's speak to the

inconsistency.

8
9

I want to review that again because

it turns on whether I admit this evidence or not.

5

7

Okay.

MR. SEILER:

Okay.

The Rules of Evidence make

declarations made for medical treatment purposes admissible.

10

This statute says it's not admissible unless certain events

11

occur.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SEILER:

Okay.
Those events aren't particularly relevant

14

because no one argues they did occur.

15

legislature pass an act in 1973, some 12 years before the Court

16

issued its memorandum decision or it's decision that I provided

17

to the Court in 1985, and the Court specifically says, "We —

18

better read it because if I don't I might misspeak.

19

"The Court adopts all existing statutory Rules of Procedure and

20

Evidence not inconsistent or superceded by the Rules of Procedure

21

and Evidence heretofore adopted by this Court," effective July 1,

22

1985.

23

So you're having the state

I

It says,

So if the Supreme Court is the one that gets to adopt

24

the Rules of Evidence and they say, "Yeah, we're going to take on

25

the statutory rules if they're not inconsistent with the Rules of

-621 1 Evidence," and this statute is inconsistent with the Rules of

2

Evidence that makes it not effective and not enforcea ble, and I

3

thirik --

4

THE COURT:

5

the statement for t reatment.

6

MR. SEILER

Exactly.

7

THE COURT:

All right.

8

MR. SEILER :

9

THE COURT:

Because it would otherwise make inadmissible

Does the Court have other questions?
No, I just want to make sure I understand

10

the theories, the d iscussion -- what would be incumbent upon this

11

Coui"t is the admissibility of this evidence, then.

12

tendering and offering that evidence you think -- you object to

13

it?

14

MR. FOX:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. FOX:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. FOX:

Y ou' re

That's correct.
Okay.
I don't want to -Go ahead.

Go ahead.

If the issue turns on whether

it's

19

inconsistent or not , I think that's for the Judge to decide.

20

There are lots of situations where one statute has

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. FOX:

In this case

—

-- on its face an inconsistency wi th another

23

stat ute and the Cou rt has to reconcile that

24

can.

25

THE COURT:

—

inconsist ency if it

Well, I'm just thinking of it in terms of

j
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respect your objection, Mr. Fox, on that subject, and I

2

understand you take a different view and understandably why.

3

However, I am persuaded to grant the motion.

I believe

4

and am persuaded with Mr. Seller's arguments regarding the fact

5

that the response -- that Ms. Fox, Linda Fox, cannot give

6

testimony as a lay person regarding the nature, the necessity or

7

the extent of her treatment and whether it was necessary and

8

reasonable, or if the expenses incurred for that treatment were

9

necessary or reasonable.

That only an expert that is involved in

10

that field can give testimony as to the reasonableness of the

11

expenses incurred and the necessity of the treatment.

12

argue that you don't apply fix -- fixating braces to knees unless

13

they're necessary, but that's not something this Court can

14

speculate on.

One might

It requires expertise.

15

With the assumptions of the record that have been

16

referred to, I'm also persuaded to grant the motion on the

17

question of proximate cause.

18

shows that Ms. Fox suffered from a degenerative condition in her

19

knee prior to her fall at the Harmon building.

20

she was advised of a future required knee replacement by her

21

physician.

22

The Court notes that the record

I understand that

The Court has, therefore, before it two plausible and

23

alternative explanations as to why she fell.

24

Brigham Young University negligently maintained the stairway, and

25

that that negligence created a dangerous condition that caused

It is possible that
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Mrs. Fox to fall and injure her leg.

2

record, it is possible to argue -- arguably it is possible that

3

Ms. Fox had a physical condition that caused her leg to do as she

4

described, to go out from underneath her and caused her fall --

5

her to fall or otherwise fall on well maintained stairs, or even

6

possibly not-so-well maintained stairs.

7

However, based on the

In any event, it is Mrs. Fox's burden to demonstrate the

8

cause of her fall.

Mrs. Fox is simply not in a position to offer

9

reliable testimony that discloses the possibility that her

10

condition could not have been the cause of her fall on the Harmon

11

Building steps.

12

qualified medical expert who would opine as to whether a person

13

with Ms. Fox's condition could safely negotiate a stairway.

14

That matter would require the testimony of a

I note and I've read this case several times, the Utah

15

Court of Appeals has noted the need for positive expert testimony

16

to establish a causal link between the defendant's negligent act

17

and the plaintiff's injury depends upon the nature of the injury.

18

There must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably

19

caused the injury.

20

adopted a burden shifting theory as described by the plaintiff in

21

the Connecticut case referred to in the opposing memorandum.

22

In that regard I'm unpersuaded that Utah has

In this case the issue is not so much of a post accident

23

injury but rather the pre-accident condition

24

the cause of her fall.

25

qualified to address this issue.

that

may have been

Mrs. Fox presents no witness that is
In short, plaintiffs have set
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forth nothing to direct the Court to one or the other theory.

2

The Court is unable to speculate as to a plausible cause for her

3

injuries.

4

see how the plaintiff could prevail in their case without expert

5

testimony on the subject of causation.

6

With the burden being the plaintiffs, the Court cannot

Now I understand you take a different view of this

7

matter, Mr. Fox, and I respect that view.

This is a critical

8

question, and I have not taken it lightly, and I believe that if

9

the Court hears evidence as to different potential causation and

10

then makes a decision, I am simply speculating as to the decision

11

of what causation I'm persuaded by, and I cannot do that -- have

12

expert testimony and that would be reversible error, in my

13

opinion, though you take a different view.

14
15
16

I understand that.

Having said that, where does that leave us with this
case?
MR. FOX:

Well, it sounds like the Court has made a

17

directed verdict with respect

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. FOX:

20

THE COURT:

21

be an element of negligence.

—

It sounds like that --- with respect to causation.
I believe that's probably true, which would

22

MR. FOX:

That's right.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. FOX:

25

MR. SEILER:

Is this case founded solely on negligence?

Yes.
It is.

-68THE COURT:

Is there any other business I need to

address?
MR. SEILER:
THE COURT:

I don't believe so.
All right.

Thank you very much.

Have a

good day.
MR. FOX:

Thank you.

COURT BAILIFF:

All rise.

(Hearing concluded)

This Court is in recess.
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